Overview
Title
To protect elections for public office by providing enhanced security for the infrastructure used to carry out such elections, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
S. 5615 is a bill to make sure that U.S. elections are safe by using paper ballots that everyone can check and by keeping voting machines secure from hacking. It also wants to make sure it’s easy for people with disabilities to vote, and it plans to spend a lot of money to help states buy secure voting equipment and improve voting systems in a smart way.
Summary AI
The bill S. 5615 aims to enhance the security of election infrastructure in the United States. It requires the use of voter-verifiable paper ballots and outlines procedures for manual counting, especially for recounts and audits. The bill mandates accessibility measures for individuals with disabilities and introduces strict cybersecurity requirements for voting systems, including prohibitions on using wireless communications and internet connections in voting systems. Additionally, it provides for grants to improve election security and mandates that voting machines, software, and critical components be manufactured and maintained within the United States.
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AnalysisAI
General Summary of the Bill
The "Election Security Act of 2024," as introduced in the 118th Congress, aims to enhance the security and integrity of elections for public office in the United States. The bill mandates the use of voter-verifiable paper ballots and sets forth requirements to ensure accessibility for individuals with disabilities. It also includes provisions to enhance the security of voting systems, such as prohibiting wireless communication devices and internet connections in voting system components. Furthermore, the bill establishes protocols for post-election audits, designates election infrastructure as critical to national security, and introduces guidelines for electronic poll books and remote ballot marking systems. The bill seeks to mandate that voting machines be manufactured and assembled in the United States, and it provides for federal grants to assist states in updating their election systems.
Summary of Significant Issues
The bill introduces a range of requirements that raise significant issues. A primary concern is the cost and implementation burden on jurisdictions needing to transition to paper ballots, which could lead to fiscal challenges if not carefully managed. Additionally, the bill’s prohibition of wireless communication devices may hinder the integration of modern technologies essential for election security. The requirement for U.S.-based manufacturing and assembly of voting machines may raise costs and limit vendor options, which could lead to supply chain constraints. Furthermore, the timeline for implementing post-election audits is considered extended, which might delay necessary improvements in election auditing practices.
Impact on the Public
Broadly, the bill aims to reinforce the integrity and security of electoral processes, which is crucial for maintaining public trust in democratic institutions. The focus on using paper ballots and conducting audits is intended to reassure the public of the reliability of election results. However, the financial implications of implementing these measures could affect taxpayers and state budgets, potentially leading to increased public spending or reallocations of fiscal resources. The prohibition of internet connections and wireless devices may be perceived positively by those concerned about cybersecurity but could also be seen as a step back in integrating more efficient technologies.
Impact on Specific Stakeholders
State and Local Governments: These bodies will bear the brunt of implementing the new requirements for election infrastructure, which could lead to increased administrative burdens and financial commitments. While federal grants are available, the criteria and allocation of funds may not fully offset these expenses, potentially straining smaller or less wealthy jurisdictions.
Vendors and Manufacturers: The emphasis on domestically developed and assembled voting equipment could benefit U.S. manufacturers by providing them with more opportunities. However, it may limit competition by excluding international vendors, impacting market diversity and possibly leading to higher costs.
Voters with Disabilities: Improved accessibility features, such as voter-verifiable paper ballots and independently usable voting devices, are a positive development for individuals with disabilities, ensuring they have equal opportunities to participate in elections.
Election Security Experts and Advocates: These stakeholders may view the bill favorably because of its emphasis on enhancing security measures. Still, they might express concern about the possible limitations imposed by restrictions on technological advancements.
Overall, while the Election Security Act of 2024 endeavors to improve the robustness and trustworthiness of U.S. elections, its implementation could present significant challenges to states, voters, and the election technology market.
Financial Assessment
The bill known as S. 5615, titled the "Election Security Act of 2024," involves several financial appropriations and outlines funding allocations related to enhancing election security in the United States. Here is a detailed review of the financial aspects of this legislation:
Financial Allocations and Appropriations
Section 103 provides an authorization of $10,000,000 for grants to study and report on accessible voting options. This funding is intended to aid in making voting more accessible, particularly for individuals with disabilities, by supporting research and development in this area.
Section 108 details a substantial financial authorization for grants, amounting to $2,400,000,000 for fiscal year 2026. Additionally, it allocates $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2028, 2030, and 2032. These grants aim to assist states in acquiring compliant paper ballot voting systems and implementing security improvements for voting infrastructure.
The appropriations outlined in this bill aim to support significant improvements in voting security and accessibility. However, several financial implications arise from these appropriations:
Potential Costs for Jurisdictions: With Section 102's requirement for "individual, durable, voter-verifiable paper ballots," jurisdictions may face considerable costs to update or replace their voting systems to meet these new standards. This could result in unanticipated financial burdens for state and local governments unless carefully managed.
Vendor Limitations and Increased Costs: Section 205 mandates that voting machines and related components must be developed, manufactured, and assembled in the United States. This requirement may elevate costs due to a constrained supply chain and limited vendor options. It may also impact state budgets and taxpayer resources by increasing public spending.
Funding Oversight and Allocation: The authorization of $10,000,000 for accessibility studies under Section 247 lacks detailed criteria or performance metrics, raising concerns about accountability and the efficient use of taxpayer money.
Domestic Vendor Preferences: Section 108 appears to favor vendors from the United States or Five Eyes countries for election infrastructure contracts. This could potentially reduce competition, limiting access to a broader range of skilled vendors, affecting market diversity, and possibly increasing costs.
Overall, while the financial allocations are substantial and targeted to bolster election security and accessibility, the implementation of these measures must be closely monitored to ensure that funds are used efficiently and equitably. Such oversight will be crucial to balance the goals of improved election security with prudent financial management to avoid unforeseen fiscal challenges for state budgets and taxpayers.
Issues
The requirement in Section 102 for 'individual, durable, voter-verifiable paper ballots' may result in significant costs for jurisdictions needing to update or purchase new voting systems, potentially leading to wasteful spending if not carefully managed. This is significant for both legal and financial reasons as it may create unintended fiscal burdens for state and local governments.
Section 106's prohibition of any wireless communication devices could pose challenges for integrating modern technologies into voting systems while maintaining security, potentially limiting future technological adaptations needed for improved election security. This restriction is significant for both legal and technological reasons as it may complicate the adoption of newer, potentially more secure technologies.
The requirement in Section 205 for voting machines, software, and code to be developed, manufactured, and assembled in the United States by November 2026 might increase costs and limit vendor options, potentially leading to supply chain constraints and increased public spending. This has significant financial implications that could impact state budgeting and taxpayer resources.
Section 108 might heavily favor domestic or Five Eyes alliance entities due to criteria for election infrastructure vendors, potentially reducing competition and limiting access to qualified vendors from non-Five Eyes countries. This could be politically and ethically significant as it may raise issues of fairness and market diversity.
The authorization of $10,000,000 for grants under Section 247 without detailed criteria or performance metrics raises concerns about accountability and potential wasteful spending. This raises significant financial concerns about oversight and proper allocation of taxpayer money.
Section 102's potential ambiguity in terms of confidentiality of vote selections and the emphasis on manual counts during inconsistencies is significant for legal and ethical reasons, as it may compromise voter privacy and lead to operational inefficiencies.
The timeline for implementation in Section 303A for post-election audits seems extended to 2034, with potential waivers extending to 2038, which could delay necessary improvements in election auditing processes and reduce electoral integrity. This is significant for political and legal reasons as it affects transparency and public trust in electoral processes.
The language in Section 301A requiring states to submit detailed voting system usage plans could potentially create significant administrative burdens and additional costs for state election officials, significant for both administrative and financial reasons.
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The first section of this act provides its title, stating that it may be referred to as the "Election Security Act of 2024".
101. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The first section of the bill specifies the short title, stating that this legislation can be officially referred to as the “Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2024”.
102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section amends the Help America Vote Act to require voting systems to use paper ballots that can be verified by voters and safeguarded as official records for recounts or audits. It mandates that paper ballots should be hand-counted when necessary and emphasizes updates to voting system requirements as technology evolves, while ensuring all ballots, including paper ones, are accessible in different languages.
103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with disabilities Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section amends the Help America Vote Act to improve voting accessibility for individuals with disabilities by requiring voting systems to ensure equal access and privacy, introduce paper ballots that can be verified independently, and mandate accessible devices at polling places. It also establishes grants for developing new voting technologies, mandates coordination with other research, and ensures the technology is publicly available, with $10 million authorized for this purpose.
Money References
- “(e) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $10,000,000, to remain available until expended.”. (2) CLERICAL
247. Study and report on accessible voting options Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The bill section provides for the Commission to give grants to at least two qualified groups to research and create accessible and secure voting systems for people with disabilities. The developed technology must be available to the public without proprietary restrictions, and $10 million is authorized for these efforts, which are coordinated with other accessible voting technology research.
Money References
- (e) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $10,000,000, to remain available until expended.
104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section amends the Help America Vote Act to require that all voter-verifiable paper ballots be printed on durable paper that can last through multiple counts and resist damage over a 22-month period. It also mandates that paper ballots marked using a device must be readable by both voters and machines used by individuals with disabilities.
105. Study and report on optimal ballot design Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The Election Assistance Commission is tasked with studying the best ways to design election ballots, whether on paper or digitally, to reduce confusion and mistakes. They must report their findings to Congress within a year after the act is passed.
106. Ballot marking device cybersecurity requirements Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section amends the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to prohibit the use of any wireless communication devices in ballot systems and to prevent these systems from being connected to the internet or any external computer networks to ensure cybersecurity in elections.
107. Effective date for new requirements Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The amendment to Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 outlines when states and jurisdictions must follow new voting system requirements. These requirements generally start in 2026, but there are exceptions for some areas that use older voting machines or systems with certain features, allowing them more time to comply until they upgrade or change their systems.
108. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying out voting system security improvements Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section discusses grants that will be available to U.S. states to update their voting systems to use paper ballots and improve voting security. It outlines the specific uses of these grants, including replacing outdated machines, enhancing cybersecurity, and ensuring accessibility, along with the eligibility requirements for states to receive the funding.
Money References
- “(a) Authorization.—There are authorized to be appropriated for grants under this part— “(1) $2,400,000,000 for fiscal year 2026; and “(2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2028, 2030, and 2032.
297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying out voting system security improvements Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section provides that the Commission will grant funds to eligible states to replace or upgrade their voting systems to meet new standards, improve voting system security, implement best practices, and acquire accessible voting systems. States will receive a minimum amount based on their size, plus additional funds based on their voting-age population, and must spend at least 10% of the funds on accessible voting systems.
297A. Voting system security improvements described Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
A voting system security improvement involves various activities such as buying goods and services from qualified vendors, conducting cybersecurity training, assessing risks and vulnerabilities of election systems, maintaining and enhancing cybersecurity for election infrastructure, and improving voter registration systems, ensuring that these activities bolster the security of a state's election infrastructure. Qualified vendors are those who provide or intend to provide services related to election infrastructure and meet specific criteria under relevant legislation.
297B. Eligibility of States Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
A state can receive a grant if it applies to the Commission with a plan for using the funds, promises to improve voting system security within five years, and provides any other required information.
297C. Reports to Congress Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The Commission is required to submit a report to specific committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate within 90 days after the end of each fiscal year. These reports must detail the activities funded under this part.
297D. Authorization of appropriations Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section authorizes the use of federal funds for grants, specifying $2.4 billion for the year 2026 and $175 million for each of the years 2028, 2030, and 2032, with any allocated funds remaining available until they are completely used.
Money References
- (a) Authorization.—There are authorized to be appropriated for grants under this part— (1) $2,400,000,000 for fiscal year 2026; and (2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2028, 2030, and 2032. (b) Continuing availability of amounts.—Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of this section shall remain available until expended. ---
201. Post-election audit requirement Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section introduces a requirement for states to conduct post-election audits of federal election results, with the aim of verifying the accuracy of the reported outcomes through manual inspection of ballots. The bill sets timelines for compliance, establishes guidelines for how these audits should be conducted, and mandates public reporting of audit results, while allowing states that are ready to audit all contests to bypass certain requirements.
303A. Post-election audits Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
In this section of the bill, post-election audits are defined as processes to ensure the accuracy of election outcomes through manual checking of ballots, with states required to set up specific rules and procedures for these audits by 2034 unless extensions are granted. Starting with specific contests from 2026, these audits will become mandatory for all federal elections, with reports made public while protecting voter anonymity.
202. Election infrastructure designation Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section amends a part of the Homeland Security Act to explicitly include "election infrastructure" as part of the protected elements, emphasizing its significance in national security.
203. Guidelines and certification for electronic poll books and remote ballot marking systems Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The text outlines changes to the Help America Vote Act of 2002, introducing voluntary guidelines and certification for electronic poll books and remote ballot marking systems. These guidelines focus on the design, functionality, accessibility, and security of these systems, with specific definitions provided for each term.
204. Pre-election reports on voting system usage Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The new section 301A of the Help America Vote Act requires that, starting with the 2026 general election, each state must submit a detailed plan on how it will use voting systems to the Commission 120 days before the election, including any updates if new systems are acquired close to the election date.
301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section requires that each state must submit a detailed plan to the Commission about how they will use voting systems, including electronic poll books, at least 120 days before federal elections. If any changes are made to the voting system within this 120-day period, updated reports must be submitted. This rule starts with the November 2026 election and continues for every federal election thereafter.
205. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section of the bill requires that by November 2026, each state should ensure, as much as possible, that voting machines used in federal elections are manufactured and assembled in the United States. Additionally, any software or code developed for these voting systems should also be developed and stored domestically.