The "STRATEGIC Act of 2024" is a proposed law aiming to address various issues related to China's influence and practices, enhance economic and security partnerships, and promote international research and human rights. It involves reforms and actions across multiple sectors, including foreign agent registration, economic coercion, international relations, technology, sanctions, and United Nations engagement, all intended to strengthen the United States' strategic position globally.

The section provides definitions for key terms used in the Act. It specifies that "appropriate congressional committees" generally refer to the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations and the House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, unless stated otherwise in specific parts of the Act. It also defines "PRC" as the People’s Republic of China and "Secretary" as the Secretary of State.

The section modifies the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 by updating definitions and organizational structure. It provides specific definitions for terms like "agent of a foreign principal," outlines exceptions for certain media entities, and defines terms such as "appropriate committees of Congress," "documentary material," "investigation," and "Lobbying Disclosure Act exemption."

The section modifies the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 by adding restrictions on certain exemptions for agents representing foreign countries like China, Russia, and Iran. It allows the Secretary of State, with the Attorney General, to suggest changing the list of these countries, and any changes must be approved by a joint resolution from Congress, with the section terminating by October 1, 2028.

The section increases the penalties for violations under the Foreign Agents Registration Act to a fine of up to $200,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years, and sets a penalty of up to $15,000 and/or six months in prison for certain specified violations. Additionally, it makes it illegal for registered foreign agents to fail to disclose their status during meetings with U.S. Congress members or their staff.

The section deals with civil penalties for those required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. It outlines fines for failing to submit timely registration statements or supplements, and higher fines for knowingly failing to correct deficient filings or comply with other provisions, with the collected fines going towards enforcement costs.

The section grants the Attorney General the power to issue civil investigative demands for documents, testimony, or answers relating to the investigation of foreign agents. It outlines the process, limitations, and protections for handling, using, and challenging these demands, aiming to enforce the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

The section describes the powers of the Attorney General to issue a civil investigative demand for documents, answers, or testimony from individuals or entities when investigating violations related to the registration of agents of foreign principals. It outlines the procedures for serving demands, rights of recipients, protections for confidential information, and how the materials can be used or challenged in court, emphasizing careful adherence to legal standards and timeframes.

The amendments introduced in this part of the bill will become effective 180 days after the bill is officially signed into law.

The section aims to restrict U.S. institutions from accepting large gifts or contracts from certain Chinese individuals and entities, especially if these involve sensitive technologies or conditions that might affect academic freedom or national security. It mandates penalties, disclosure requirements, and a waiver process, while setting up guidelines to help institutions comply.

In this section, the bill requires U.S. think tanks to disclose any foreign funding, particularly from entities related to China, Iran, or Russia, if they meet specific criteria, such as receiving a certain amount of funding or hosting events with Department officials. It also mandates the Secretary to establish rules for these disclosures and submit a report to Congress on the implementation and challenges of these rules.

The amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 excludes China's government from certain cultural exchanges and introduces rigorous review and reporting requirements for cultural exchanges involving China to ensure compliance with U.S. interests. It also authorizes $45 million for exchange support, including hiring staff for oversight.

The section describes rules for U.S. entities involved in cultural exchange programs with China, emphasizing strict reporting and transparency. Before starting a new program, the Department of State must certify that it aligns with U.S. interests and requires detailed annual reports from U.S. participants, including numbers of activities, participants, and any potential issues with China, ensuring oversight and the option to suspend or terminate programs if necessary.

The section establishes the Countering the People’s Republic of China Influence Fund to counteract the malign influence of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worldwide. A designated U.S. official will oversee the fund, ensuring its use aligns with U.S. interests, and funds may be used for efforts like promoting transparency, supporting independent media, and countering undue influence in various sectors.

The section outlines a rule requiring the Department of State and USAID to notify Congress at least 15 days before their officials attend private events outside the U.S., if these events involve individuals or entities on a U.S. government list of sanctioned persons. It also states that no federal funds can be used for such events if they promote business activities and include individuals who are on the sanctioned list.

In Section 116 of the bill, it is outlined that a decision must be made within 90 days about whether the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party should face sanctions under various laws and orders. This decision, including detailed justification, will be reported to certain congressional committees and will primarily be unclassified, with the option for a classified annex.

The bill requires the Secretary of State to create a list of foreign talent recruitment programs from China, in cooperation with several government officials, and to publish it in the Federal Register within 180 days of the bill's enactment. Additionally, the Secretary must review and update this list at least once a year and republish the updated version.

The section requires the Secretary to submit reports every 90 days to Congress detailing the United States' climate-related activities with China, including joint projects and collaborations. It also states that actions related to climate cannot be used as a reason to exempt or bypass any U.S. sanctions or regulations involving China.

The section restricts the issuance of U.S. visas to senior Chinese government and military officials, their families, members of the Chinese cabinet, active military personnel, and students or workers from Chinese universities with certain agreements with U.S. institutions, unless strict security checks are passed. These restrictions can be lifted if the Director of National Intelligence confirms that China has stopped infringing on U.S. intellectual property rights.

The proposed amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Fentanyl Sanctions Act aim to strengthen the United States' response to drug trafficking. They focus on improving reporting on countries exporting methamphetamine, assessing collaboration with China on fentanyl issues, and expanding sanctions against those involved in opioid trafficking, including individuals and entities in China and other countries.

The section requires the Secretary of State to report to Congress within 180 days of the law's enactment and annually for five years about cases in which U.S. diplomats' immunities were violated in China. It also asks for a review of how the State Department is addressing these violations.

The section mandates the Secretary to submit an annual report to Congress detailing all official engagements by Chinese diplomatic missions in the U.S., including their date, location, purpose, participants, and any related agreements or issues. The report can be classified or unclassified and should also cover security concerns and how these engagements might affect U.S. interests.

The section restricts activities by Chinese foreign missions in U.S. elementary and secondary schools that receive federal funds, unless U.S. missions in China have similar access. These restricted activities include financial support, educational resources, events, propaganda, Confucius Institutes, student exchanges, or anything compromising academic independence. If such activities are discovered, the schools must report them, and potential sanctions include diplomatic restrictions and personnel expulsion. Congress must be notified within 14 days of any attempts.

The section establishes an Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology, appoints its leader as a Special Envoy with ambassador rank, and outlines its roles, including coordinating international technology collaboration, ensuring secure development and governance of new technologies, and preventing illicit technology transfers. The Office will also collaborate with allies and partners to oppose authoritarian threats to technology freedom and must report annually to Congress on its activities and findings related to critical technologies and potential threats from countries like China and Russia.

The section requires the Secretary of State to notify important congressional committees before making or renewing any science and technology agreements with China, providing details like the full agreement text and its national security impact. Existing agreements must be revoked unless notification is submitted within 60 days of the new rule taking effect.

The section outlines that the Secretary of State must notify certain congressional committees at least 30 days before entering into, renewing, or extending any science and technology agreement with China. The notification must include the full text of the agreement, reasons for its necessity, potential risks, human rights considerations, monitoring capabilities, and any additional relevant details.

In this section, the term "strategic infrastructure" refers to infrastructure that is crucial for the United States' national or economic security or that prevents foreign adversaries from taking control or ownership.

The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment allows the U.S. to use its resources and skills to work with other countries on important infrastructure projects, prioritizing those that have the greatest strategic value, especially in transportation, energy, technology, and health. The Secretary must follow strict standards, ensuring transparency and quality, and cannot limit funding for natural gas and nuclear projects simply due to carbon emissions. Support is generally not provided to wealthy countries unless it helps counter strategic competitors, and the Secretary must report on these projects annually.

The "Global Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund" is a special fund established in the U.S. Treasury to support international infrastructure projects that benefit U.S. strategic interests. It provides $75 million annually from 2025 to 2029 for projects that focus on transport, energy, tech infrastructure, and health security, prioritizing those with significant benefits to the U.S. and ensuring partnerships align with U.S. standards and laws.

The section authorizes the Secretary, in consultation with various agencies, to create the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” which aims to support sustainable and high-quality infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region. This includes initiatives like capacity-building, advisory services, and funding through designated funds, with annual reports to Congress and appropriations authorized through 2029.

The section outlines a program led by the Secretary to foster regular discussions between U.S. and allied regulatory agencies to share best practices and align standards, prioritizing collaboration with specific bilateral and multilateral partners. It also allows for the inclusion of private sector and expert participants and permits delegation of program duties to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment.

The section authorizes the U.S. government to support American companies in managing and diversifying their supply chains away from China, with a focus on aiding smaller businesses. It provides funding and ensures services are not offered to companies influenced by China or other foreign adversaries.

The text discusses the authorization for the establishment of centers of excellence in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America to improve the technical skills of officials and emerging leaders through public-private partnerships. It also outlines how the program will be funded and reported to Congress, emphasizing contributions and collaboration between the United States and participating countries.

The bill introduces a pilot program to help developing countries that are allies of the United States overcome barriers to trade and improve economic growth. It outlines how countries will be selected for this assistance, the goals for removing obstacles to international commerce, and the requirements for creating actionable plans to achieve these goals, with the program set to end in eight years.

Congress emphasizes the importance of the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, which creates standardized rules for receivables financing, helping U.S. businesses access international capital. The Senate believes the Secretary should promote the Convention to encourage foreign investment in developing countries and establish predictable financial frameworks, and a report to Congress on these efforts is required annually until 2030.

The section discusses the United States policy to oppose additional financial assistance from multilateral development banks, like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, to China because it no longer meets the eligibility requirements. It directs the U.S. Treasury to instruct its representatives at these banks to oppose loans to China and requires an annual report on China's borrowing status and other related information.

The “Ending China’s Unfair Advantage Act of 2024” prohibits the use of federal funds for the Montreal Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change until China is no longer considered a developing country in these agreements. The President must certify these changes to Congress before funding can resume.

The section provides a short title for the subtitle, which is called the “Countering Economic Coercion Act of 2024.”

Congress expresses concern that foreign adversaries are using economic strategies to negatively impact U.S. allies, which threatens national security, and urges the U.S. to work with allies to support those affected and oppose such tactics collectively.

The section defines several key terms related to Congressional committees and international relations. These include specific congressional committees involved in various governmental exercises, the concept of economic coercion involving foreign adversaries, the meanings of terms related to exports, and definitions of foreign adversaries and trading partners.

The provided section outlines the President's ability to determine and respond to economic coercion by a foreign adversary, which is seen as a long-term national security threat. It details the process for extended and emergency determinations, including requirements for consultation, documentation, and submission of notices to Congress, and provides criteria under which such determinations can be revoked or expire.

The section outlines the powers available to the United States in dealing with economic coercion, including offering financial and technical assistance to allies and taking actions against adversaries. These powers include providing aid and financial support to partner countries, expedited trade processes, and potentially investigating and responding to coercive actions from other nations.

The President, Secretary, and United States Trade Representative are tasked with working together with international allies to support any foreign trading partner facing economic pressure from a foreign adversary. This includes coordinating supportive actions, opposing coercion, and exploring potential agreements through institutions like the World Trade Organization.

The section outlines a fast-track process for Congress to respond to situations where a foreign trading partner is facing economic pressure. If the President identifies such a case, they can propose specific actions to Congress, which must act quickly to assemble and consider a special bill to address the situation with limited debate and amendment opportunities in both the House and Senate.

In this section of the bill, it explains the process for Congress to disapprove presidential emergency actions related to economic coercion. It outlines how a "joint resolution of disapproval" can be introduced and considered in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, detailing the steps and rules for debate, voting, and potential veto handling.

Entities owned or controlled by a foreign country are prohibited from setting prices below average variable cost if it harms competition, without needing to prove market power. Courts can consider government subsidies in determining the impact, and affected businesses can sue for damages. The law also allows the State and Justice Departments to submit relevant briefs to aid in these cases.

The amendment expands the definition of trade secret theft to include unauthorized development or modification of a product or digital article that couldn't be made without access to certain information. It also makes it illegal for someone to try to bring such an altered product into the U.S. and clarifies that digital articles include technologies like algorithms, digitized processes, or databases.

The section outlines procedures for reviewing petitions related to theft of intellectual property and forced technology transfer by foreign entities. It establishes a multi-agency committee to review these petitions, determine if sanctions are needed, and empowers the President to impose various sanctions to protect U.S. national security.

The section discusses how the Secretary should support natural gas and nuclear energy projects without limiting funds based on carbon emissions or cost alternatives. It emphasizes the importance of considering partner countries' energy needs, enhancing U.S. foreign policy interests, and ensuring federal funds supplement private investments without interfering with them, while managing these projects under the authority of U.S. embassy officials.

The section mandates that the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury instruct U.S. representatives at the International Monetary Fund to oppose increasing the weight of the Chinese renminbi in valuing Special Drawing Rights unless China meets specific conditions, including compliance with fund agreements, no recent currency manipulation reports, and having a freely usable currency. This rule expires 10 years after the act is enacted.

The section modifies the Special Drawing Rights Act to change how often the period for allocations is measured from "each basic period" to "any 10-year period," and it requires that 25% of the United States quota be considered. Additionally, it extends the time frame for required consultations from 90 days to 180 days, and includes a provision preventing consent or agreement to allocations without consultations.

This section of the bill outlines new rules for foreign ownership of agricultural land in the U.S., requiring government review of purchases or leases by nationals from certain countries, particularly those near military bases. It also mandates annual reports on foreign-held agricultural land, identifying countries with significant holdings and detailing how the land is used.

The section outlines the requirement for reports to be sent to the states, with a specific deadline for transmission.

The bill requires the creation of an "IP violators list" that identifies Chinese state-owned enterprises involved in intellectual property theft harming U.S. businesses and those using stolen technology, in consultation with various U.S. officials and international allies. An annual report is to be published, ensuring confidentiality for business information unless consent for disclosure is given, while allowing for a declassified version of the information to be released.

The section requires an annual report about the risks posed by Chinese companies in U.S. stock markets, focusing on issues like national security threats and violations of human rights. The report will identify such companies, explain their activities, and offer policy recommendations, considering factors such as military contributions and non-compliance with U.S. laws.

From October 1, 2027, the Department of State cannot use its funds to buy batteries from certain specified companies, unless a waiver stating it's in the national interest is given by the Secretary. These companies include CATL, BYD, and others that are involved in either assembling or manufacturing the batteries, or providing most of their components.

The section requires the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to direct the U.S. Executive Director at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to restrict Investment Project Financing contracts from being awarded to Chinese entities or individuals and those on various sanction lists. Additionally, the Treasury must report to Congress annually on such contracts awarded by international development banks, including specific details about the projects and any changes in World Bank policies.

The section requires the Secretary to submit a report to specific congressional committees within 180 days of the act's enactment. The report should describe how various U.S. agencies coordinate on international development projects, especially focusing on competing with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and detail strategies and priorities in cooperation with global partners.

In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” is defined to include the Senate committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and the House of Representatives committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services.

The section expresses Congress's concern about China's expanding nuclear weapons program and its lack of cooperation in reducing nuclear threats. It limits U.S. funding for certain discussions with China that involve both government and non-government representatives, as these talks have not been productive and may benefit China more than the U.S.

The section details the U.S. Congress's position and policy on enhancing the Department of State's resources to address international security challenges, especially those related to China and Russia. It emphasizes increasing funding and personnel for the Indo-Pacific region, maintaining knowledge of Russian affairs, and creating an action plan for these goals, with regular updates provided to Congress.

The section mandates that, within 180 days of the law being enacted, the Secretary, with assistance from the Secretary of Defense, must deliver a report to Congress about the U.S.'s diplomatic efforts related to any Chinese military bases abroad. The report should list countries hosting or considering hosting Chinese military bases, analyze how these bases affect U.S. interests, and discuss related U.S. diplomatic efforts and lessons from China's base in Djibouti, with the report being mostly classified but potentially offering an unclassified summary.

Congress has expressed concern that China is using its Belt and Road Initiative to expand its military reach globally, which could threaten U.S. security interests and those of its allies. As a result, it has proposed a restriction on providing certain U.S. aid to countries that host Chinese military installations, unless the President can justify it as beneficial to U.S. national interests.

The amendment to the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act introduces a new section that emphasizes the need for the United States, along with partner countries like Iraq and Jordan, to develop strategies to protect against threats from drones operated by Iranian-backed groups. It authorizes the President to enter cooperative agreements for the development and testing of defense technologies to counter these drone threats and ensures any projects are defensive, with strict requirements for handling defense materials.

The section outlines Congress's concerns about threats from drone attacks and authorizes the President to enter agreements with Iraq, Jordan, and countries on the Arabian Peninsula to develop defense technologies against such threats. It specifies that these agreements should be defensive, include intellectual property rights negotiations, and comply with existing US arms export laws, while clarifying it doesn't authorize military force.

The section outlines the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) provisions, defining key terms and modifying certain legal provisions related to international defense agreements. It also requires the Secretary to report to Congress on various aspects of U.S. participation in the MTCR, including opportunities, challenges, and technical and diplomatic engagements, as well as detailing disinformation efforts and cooperative activities involving countries like China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea.

Congress acknowledges that the commitments between the U.S. and South Korea to deter nuclear threats have not been effective and suggests creating a Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to enhance their defense strategy. The NCG aims to improve communication and coordination on nuclear deterrence and involve South Korea more in defense decisions while adapting military strategies to better address threats from North Korea.

The section outlines a plan for the United States to prepare and potentially impose sanctions on Chinese entities supporting actions against Taiwan, such as attempts to overthrow Taiwan's government or violate its territory. It establishes an interagency task force to identify these entities, create strategies for sanctions, and work with U.S. allies to mitigate economic impacts, while reporting regularly to Congress on its progress and findings.

The section mandates that the U.S. should recognize Taiwan's democratically elected government as the legitimate authority and stop calling them "authorities." It also states that there should be no limits on communication or travel between U.S. officials and their counterparts in Taiwan, including allowing senior Taiwanese officials to travel to the United States without restrictions.

The section allows the President to transfer surplus military items like armor and missiles to Taiwan, which are intended for reserve use. Before any transfer, the President must notify specific congressional committees at least 30 days in advance, detailing the items and any concessions involved.

In this section, it is stated that for the fiscal year 2025, no funds for the Department of State can be used to enforce any policies that stop Taiwanese government or military representatives from displaying the Taiwanese flag or military symbols during official activities, such as ceremonies or on social media.

The section outlines that the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office must be approved by the Senate and will be called a “Representative”.

The section states that this part of the bill can be referred to as the "South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024."

The section outlines potential sanctions imposed by the U.S. President on certain Chinese persons involved in activities related to the South China Sea and East China Sea, including asset blocking, visa bans, export restrictions, and investment prohibitions. It provides definitions for key terms, details conditions under which sanctions may be imposed, describes the types of sanctions available, and lists exceptions to the sanctions, specifying that penalties apply for violations.

The section expresses Congress's opinion that the U.S. Government Publishing Office should avoid producing any official materials suggesting that the U.S. recognizes disputed territories in the South China Sea or regions managed by Japan or South Korea in the East China Sea as belonging to China.

Congress expresses its view that the United States and the international community should reject China's illegal claims in the South China Sea, as determined by a 2016 tribunal ruling, and emphasizes the importance of supporting international law and maintaining peace and stability in the region. Additionally, all countries with claims in the South China Sea should manage disputes peacefully and in line with international law, avoiding aggressive actions or intimidation.

The section requires the Secretary to report to Congress within 60 days and then annually for three years on countries that officially recognize China's claims over disputed territories in the South China Sea or areas in the East China Sea managed by Japan or South Korea. The report must be publicly accessible, though a classified part can be included if needed for U.S. national security.

The Secretary of State has to appoint a senior official who will manage and oversee the United States' foreign relations and agreements with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. This official is responsible for making sure that assistance and resources are provided effectively and that U.S. policies towards these countries are implemented successfully.

The section outlines measures to enhance diplomatic and economic relations between the United States and Pacific island countries. It establishes funding limits for the Departments of State and Commerce, details the hiring of local staff, requires annual reports on activities and impacts, and allows the Secretary to treat American Samoa like a foreign country when implementing these initiatives.

The section states that this part of the document can be referred to as the "Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review Act of 2024."

Congress emphasizes the significant political, economic, and security interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean region and highlights the importance of collaborating with Indo-Pacific partners like India, Japan, and Australia to enhance regional governance, sustainable development, and security cooperation. Additionally, it underscores the need for deeper understanding of the issues faced by the countries in the Indian Ocean region.

The United States aims to enhance its involvement with countries in the Indian Ocean region as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. This involves fostering political, security, and economic connections; ensuring free navigation and cooperation on security challenges like piracy; and working together on environmental and maritime issues with regional partners.

The section defines key terms used in the bill: "appropriate congressional committees" refers to specific committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives, specifically related to foreign relations and armed services; the "Indian Ocean region" encompasses the Indian Ocean itself, along with nearby seas and coastal areas, while an "Indian Ocean region country" includes any nation within or bordering this region.

The section outlines a plan for the U.S. to develop a strategy for engaging with countries in the Indian Ocean region. This includes setting goals for political, economic, and security interests, coordinating with partners like India, Japan, and Australia, and assessing diplomatic and military cooperation. The plan aims to promote U.S. interests in the region, improve cooperation, and strengthen security, with progress reports required annually.

The section modifies a part of a previous law related to the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission by specifying that reports should now include details on China's military deployments in the Indian Ocean region, which covers the Indian Ocean itself and the surrounding areas like the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the East Coast of Africa. These changes will apply to any reports submitted after this new law is enacted.

The section states that this part of the bill can be referred to as the "Countering Espionage and Surveillance Entities in Cuba Act" or simply the "CEASE Act".

The section outlines sanctions that the President must impose on foreign individuals or entities involved in major transactions with Chinese military or intelligence facilities in Cuba. These sanctions include blocking assets and denying visas, but they don't apply to goods imports or entry necessary for U.S. international obligations, and they can be waived if vital for national security.

The bill states that the President is not allowed to remove any businesses or groups from the "Cuba Restricted List" if they were already on it as of July 1, 2024.

Congress expresses concern about China supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine by trading with and supplying military goods to Russia, undermining Western sanctions, and spreading Russian propaganda. They urge the United States and its allies to strengthen sanctions against Chinese entities, caution against involving China in diplomatic discussions about peace, and emphasize the importance of unity between the United States and Europe in addressing security and economic risks related to China's actions.

The text outlines a U.S. policy to boost trade and investment between the United States and Africa, focusing on key sectors and countries for mutual growth. It describes the establishment of an office within USAID to coordinate these efforts, highlights specific roles and strategies, and includes support for small and medium enterprises, diaspora investments, improving business environments, and regular evaluations of progress.

Congress acknowledges the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region and suggests that the U.S. should engage more deeply through diplomatic and security initiatives, aiming to counter influences from countries like China. A policy is established to protect interests in the Red Sea and advocate for democracy, security, and economic stability. The Secretary of State is tasked with developing an integrated, multi-agency strategy within 180 days and holding annual security forums to address shared challenges.

Congress believes it would benefit the United States to allow exceptions to a specific trade rule from 1974 for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, especially if Uzbekistan joins the World Trade Organization.

The section amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit using U.S. funds for training or supporting foreign military forces in peacekeeping exercises with China, unless the Secretary of State certifies that such activities are crucial for U.S. national security by October 1 each year.

The Department of State is establishing an Office on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel to enhance U.S. engagement with international organizations. This office will develop strategies for placing qualified U.S. personnel in key multilateral roles, coordinate the recruitment and support for the United Nations Junior Professional Office program, and oversee fellowships and transfer opportunities to bolster U.S. leadership in global institutions.

The bill authorizes $10 million each year from 2024 to 2030 to support Junior Professional Officer positions and promote U.S. candidates for leadership roles in international organizations. The Secretary is required to notify specific Congressional committees 15 days before spending these funds, detailing the amount and intended use.

The section expresses Congress's belief in the importance of the United Nations for peace, human rights, and development, and notes that the U.S. gains from its involvement. It directs the U.S. to focus on supporting the United Nations by ensuring active participation, holding employees accountable, preventing undue influence, promoting Taiwan's involvement, and addressing other priorities to maintain the United Nations' integrity.

The section requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Congress by January 31 each year until 2027, detailing China's involvement in United Nations peacekeeping efforts. The report must include information on where China's peacekeeping troops are placed, the number of troops from China and other key countries, financial contributions and benefits related to peacekeeping, and the connection between Chinese troops' locations and projects related to the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. It should also assess how many Chinese peacekeepers are part of their military or police forces, including details about their ranks and units.

The section modifies the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 to include sanctions against systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, and involuntary contraceptive implantation in Xinjiang, taking effect from the enactment of the modification and applying to the next required report.

The section mandates that the U.S. President should instruct the country's representative at the United Nations to push for changes in how members of the Human Rights Council are held accountable for serious human rights abuses. This includes making it easier to suspend membership, ensuring transparency in voting, preventing election of violators to the Council, and opposing the election of countries known for terrorism, human trafficking, use of child soldiers, or committing severe international crimes.

The United States reaffirms its policy against any interference, especially by China, in the process of recognizing a successor to the Dalai Lama, emphasizing this as a matter of religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists. The U.S. encourages international efforts to support the authority of Tibetan Buddhist leaders in this process and opposes Chinese claims or actions that infringe upon the religious rights of Tibetans.

The section states that this title can be referred to as the "Biological Weapons Act of 2024."

The text defines several terms used in the title: "appropriate congressional committees" refers to specific Senate and House committees related to foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence; the "Biological Weapons Convention" outlines an agreement from 1972 about banning dangerous biological weapons; "dual-use research of concern" involves life sciences research that could pose a threat if misused; and "other international life sciences research of concern" includes research with international partners that might enhance pandemic potential in pathogens, potentially threatening public health or national security.

The policy of the United States focuses on closely examining international research related to biology and virology to ensure it doesn't help adversaries develop biological weapons. Additionally, it aims to disclose as much information as possible about China’s compliance with biological weapon agreements.

The amendments give the Secretary of State more power to oversee research that could be used for both peaceful and harmful purposes, especially involving international life sciences and biological research. It requires the Secretary to work with other agencies to ensure such research aligns with national security goals, imposes strict rules when dealing with certain countries, and demands regular reporting to Congress on these activities.

This section outlines the responsibilities of the Secretary in overseeing dual-use and international life sciences research that poses security concerns. It mandates cooperation among various federal agencies, imposes restrictions on high-risk research with adversarial countries, and requires regular reports to Congress on research activities and collaborations.

The Secretary must submit an annual report to Congress assessing national security risks from dual-use research, which can be misused or weaponized, including efforts by countries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and any terrorist groups. The report will also evaluate the Department of State’s preventative measures, collaboration between civilian and military entities, the effectiveness of international agreements like the Biological Weapons Convention, and identify any challenges the U.S. government faces in addressing these issues.

The bill requires the President to review United States government-funded research projects with China that may relate to biological weapons or dual-use research, and to report the findings to several congressional committees. The report should include examples of projects, outline approval procedures, identify gaps in safeguards against misuse, assess contributions to weapons development, and address issues related to China's military-civil strategy and historical funding practices.

In this section, the United States outlines its policy to ensure the compliance of China with the Biological Weapons Convention. It includes promoting transparency and engaging with other countries and experts about concerns regarding China's activities, potentially declassifying related intelligence, and considering a complaint to the United Nations Security Council if these issues are not resolved.

The United States Agency for International Development must submit an annual report to Congress for five years, starting 180 days after a given law is enacted, detailing funding linked to pathogen research in specific countries, including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The report must be primarily unclassified but can contain a classified section and needs to provide national security reasons for the funding.

The section requires the U.S. representative at the United Nations to prevent countries like China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and others specified in a certain report from holding leadership roles in U.N. bodies dealing with global health and security issues. This rule will be in effect for five years from when the law is enacted.

The section states that the Act should not be interpreted as allowing or supporting U.S. Government funding for certain international scientific research that could pose threats to national security and public health.