The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 outlines various measures and authorizations related to intelligence activities, including funding and structural enhancements across multiple intelligence and security organizations. Additionally, it addresses threats from foreign entities, emerging technologies, classification reforms, workforce improvements, whistleblower protections, and other significant areas affecting national security.

In this section, the terms "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community" are defined as having the same meanings as those given in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947.

Funds can be set aside for the government's intelligence and related activities for the year 2025.

The section outlines the process for handling the classified Schedule of Authorizations related to intelligence activities. It specifies that this schedule is available to certain government committees and the President, who is responsible for appropriately distributing it within the executive branch, while ensuring it is not publicly disclosed except under specific conditions, such as legal requirements or budget implementation needs.

The section authorizes a budget of $656,573,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account for the fiscal year 2025. Additionally, more funds can be allocated as detailed in a classified document associated with the bill.

In Section 104, the law permits increasing the funds allocated for federal employees' salaries and benefits. These increases can be made as needed to cover any legally authorized boosts in pay or benefits.

The text authorizes the allocation of $514 million for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for the year 2025.

The amendments to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 make changes to how conflicts of interest are managed on the Intelligence Innovation Board. These changes include giving the designated agency ethics official the power to grant conflict of interest waivers with some conditions, such as no waivers for active conflicts involving the Board Chair and requiring approval from the Director of National Intelligence for potential conflicts, along with setting a definition for the role of the designated agency ethics official.

The section updates the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 by changing the title "National Counterintelligence Executive" to "Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center."

The section states that the funds allocated for 2025 cannot be used to hire more people in the Department of Homeland Security's Open Source Intelligence Division specifically for domestic terrorism issues beyond what was in place before this law was enacted.

The section updates the law governing the appointment of the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy, specifying that the Director, appointed by the President with Senate approval, will serve a 6-year term and can be reappointed. The Director must be a qualified senior employee with significant expertise in intelligence and related fields, and this change will take effect on January 21, 2025.

The section updates rules for the advisory board of the National Reconnaissance Office, allowing up to 8 members without conflicts of interest and specifying that no more than 2 members can be based on the same qualification. It also mandates a charter to manage conflicts of interest and extends the board's expiry date to August 31, 2027.

The section permits the Director of National Intelligence to allow the President of the National Intelligence University to accept research grants, provided they are awarded by eligible entities like federal agencies or educational institutions for scientific, literary, or educational purposes. It also outlines the establishment of an account to manage these funds, states that National Intelligence University can use its appropriations to handle related expenses, and requires regulations for administering grant funds.

The National Intelligence University can accept research grants from federal agencies or organizations focused on science, literature, or education. These grants must be awarded competitively, and received funds are to be managed in a special account, used according to rules set by the Director of National Intelligence. Additionally, the University can use its budget to cover costs related to applying for such grants.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is authorized to take certain actions to protect its facilities and assets in the United States from threats posed by unmanned aircraft, such as detecting and disrupting their control. These actions must be coordinated with the Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure that the National Airspace System is not adversely affected. The law outlines privacy protections and requires regular reporting to Congress on how these authorities are used, with a general termination of these powers set for four years after enactment unless extended by the President for national security reasons.

The section authorizes the Director to take various actions to protect certain facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft, such as detecting, disrupting, or seizing these aircraft without prior consent if they pose a threat to safety or security. It also outlines the need for coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA, emphasizes privacy protection measures, and obliges briefing and notifications to Congress, with the authority extending for 4 years unless extended by the President for national security reasons.

The section limits the use of funds for certain new intelligence programs in 2025, stating that no money can be used for these programs until the head of the relevant intelligence agency properly informs Congress, as required by existing national security laws.

The amendment to Section 501A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 places restrictions on transferring capabilities from controlled access programs to other special access programs or outside entities. It requires that before such a transfer can occur, the head of the intelligence community must notify the appropriate congressional committees and leadership of the intent to make the transfer.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard is allowed to use up to 1% of the funds from the National Intelligence Program each year for special intelligence and counterintelligence activities. These activities are confidential or urgent, and the Commandant's certification is enough to account for the spending.

The section makes it illegal to access property belonging to the U.S. intelligence community without permission if it is clearly marked as closed or restricted. Penalties for doing so include fines and imprisonment, with increasing severity for repeat offenses, starting with up to 180 days in jail for the first offense, up to 3 years for the second, and up to 10 years for the third or more.

Unauthorized access to property under the control of the intelligence community is illegal in the United States if the property is marked as closed or restricted. Penalties for breaking this law include fines and imprisonment, with increasing severity for repeated offenses, starting at up to 180 days for a first offense and up to 10 years for a third offense.

The section updates a law to rename the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of the Treasury to the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security. It establishes new responsibilities for this office, such as handling foreign intelligence related to economic policy, and specifies that the office will be led by an Assistant Secretary appointed by the President.

The section establishes the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security within the Department of the Treasury, which is responsible for handling intelligence related to economic policies. The Office will support various federal agencies by providing economic analysis and intelligence, and it will be led by an Assistant Secretary appointed by the President and approved by the Senate.

The section outlines a requirement for intelligence agencies to report annually on their use of sensitive commercially available information, including personal data, for activities beyond research and development. This includes detailing the nature, source, legal authority, and privacy precautions associated with the data, as well as the potential privacy and security risks, while public reports on these activities must be released every two years.

The section requires the Director of National Intelligence to create a policy about how the intelligence community can collect and handle information that shows the location of people in the United States. This policy must be available to the public, although some parts can remain classified and shared only with specific congressional committees.

In this section, rules are set for displaying flags, seals, and emblems at intelligence community locations. Flags other than the U.S. flag must be smaller and not positioned higher, and only specific flags like the U.S. flag, POW/MIA, and others are allowed with funding prohibitions on flying unauthorized ones.

The section requires the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to develop a strategy and reach out to U.S. industries about the security risks posed by China's smartport technology and companies like COSCO and CCCC. This effort must align with U.S. laws and Executive Orders and be coordinated with other federal agencies, including the Coast Guard and the FBI.

The section requires the Director of National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of China's biotechnology status within 30 days of enacting the bill, examining both legal and illegal support methods like investments and talent recruitment. A report of the findings must be submitted to congressional intelligence committees in an unclassified form, with the possibility of a classified annex.

The section outlines a plan for the Director of National Intelligence to work with various government officials to create a strategy for sharing intelligence about the illegal trafficking of synthetic opioid chemicals from China and other countries. It also requires the creation of a system for experts from outside the intelligence community, including those without security clearances, to share information with intelligence agencies on this issue.

The section requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on how China might be trying to bypass U.S. security and transparency regulations. This report should include efforts to evade specific laws, lists of restricted entities, and import rules, and it must be provided in an unclassified form.

The section requires the Director of National Intelligence to create and submit a detailed plan within 180 days to prioritize hiring and training people who speak Mandarin Chinese for intelligence roles. It specifies that this plan should be sent to certain congressional committees responsible for intelligence and judiciary matters.

The section requires the Director of National Intelligence to assess and report to specific congressional committees on whether Russia supports terrorism or cooperates with U.S. efforts against terrorism within 180 days of the Act's enactment. The assessment must list instances of Russian non-cooperation or support for terrorism and determine if the Wagner Group's activities amount to international terrorism, with a briefing to follow on the findings.

Within 90 days of this bill becoming law, the Director of National Intelligence, with other intelligence agencies, must give Congress an assessment on the possible outcomes of the war in Ukraine until the end of 2025. This report will explore how Ukraine's defense might change based on U.S. military and economic support, the reaction of other countries to the U.S. assistance level, and the global effects of a potential Ukrainian defeat.

The amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act makes it clear that any members, spokespeople, or supporters of terrorist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or similar groups cannot be allowed into the United States.

The section requires the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to evaluate the threat ISIS-Khorasan poses to the United States and submit a detailed report to Congress within 60 days. The report must discuss the group's history, intentions, global activities, and connections with other terrorist organizations, as well as their relationships and activities related to travel and border security.

The section aims to prevent terrorist financing by defining key terms related to digital assets and financial institutions and establishing sanctions on foreign entities that engage in transactions with terrorist organizations. It requires the Secretary of the Treasury to identify and report such entities, allows the President to impose sanctions, and provides for penalties and exceptions, including a national security waiver and an exception for intelligence activities.

The bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report to Congress, within 90 days of the bill's passing, assessing the national security impacts of allowing citizens from specific countries to travel without a visa in the Western Hemisphere. These countries are Russia, China, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Venezuela, and Cuba. The report should be unclassified but may include a classified part.

The section outlines a study to be conducted by the Director of National Intelligence, in collaboration with several U.S. government departments, on the risks posed by foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land. It mandates a detailed analysis of land ownership by foreigners from countries threatening U.S. national security, including the proximity of these lands to important infrastructure, and requires the Director to provide the findings to specific Congressional committees.

The section defines terms and outlines a requirement for the Director of National Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to assess how citizenship-by-investment programs might threaten U.S. national security. This assessment must identify such programs, evaluate risks posed by these programs when used by bad actors, and determine which countries' programs pose the biggest threat, followed by a report and briefing to Congress.

Congress has recognized that foreign adversaries often use U.S. components and services for hostile activities and is requiring a strategy to prevent this. The Director of National Intelligence will work with various U.S. departments and companies to stop foreign use of U.S. technology for harmful purposes and report on the progress annually for three years.

The bill section outlines measures to check foreign visitors or assignees seeking access to U.S. National Laboratories, aiming to safeguard sensitive technology and information from countries posing a threat to national security. It mandates thorough screening by the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, with quarterly reports to Congress on access permissions and related advisories.

In this section, the law prevents National Laboratories from letting certain foreign nationals from specific countries, such as China and Russia, visit or work there for more than 30 days, unless a special waiver is given by the Secretary of Energy after consulting with intelligence officials. The waiver can only be issued if the benefits of allowing the person outweigh any security or economic risks, and any such waivers must be reported to specific Congressional committees.

The section outlines that the Secretary of Homeland Security must publicly report every three months on the number of special interest aliens encountered at U.S. borders. These reports should include those released, supervised, detained, or removed, and emphasize individuals posing potential national security threats based on travel patterns and other information.

The bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide an assessment to specific Congressional committees within 90 days, focusing on lessons learned from the Israel-Hamas war. This includes examining various aspects such as intelligence cooperation, new warfare tactics, attacks on maritime routes, and the use of advanced weaponry, as well as analyzing the broader impact on global security and the war in Ukraine.

The section requires the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide Congress with a detailed intelligence report on the gang "Tren de Aragua", covering its leaders, structure, activities, and connections with other criminal organizations and the Venezuelan government. The report is due within 90 days and can be classified, with specific congressional committees receiving the information.

The Director of National Intelligence is required to submit a report to Congress within 90 days, assessing the economic and security ties between Nicolás Maduro's regime in Venezuela and certain countries and organizations, including Cuba, Iran, and groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC-EP. This report will be available in an unclassified form, but it may also have a classified part.

The bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide an updated report to Congress on Iran's military and terrorist spending within 90 days of the law being enacted. The report should be mostly unclassified but can have a classified part if needed.

Congress believes biotechnologies are crucial to U.S. national security, and it requires the Director of National Intelligence to create a strategy to counter potential threats from foreign nations. This strategy should identify important biotechnologies, find ways to protect them from foreign misuse, ensure secure supply chains, and suggest any needed legal or administrative changes.

The section modifies the National Security Act of 1947 to expand and clarify the responsibilities of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center by emphasizing coordination and oversight in areas like intelligence analysis related to biosecurity threats, and enhancing collaboration with the private sector and other federal agencies on biotechnology and foreign biological threats.

The section mandates that the Director of National Intelligence, together with other federal agencies, must improve the intelligence community's ability to identify threats from foreign adversaries related to biological data. This includes focusing on how such data might endanger national security, setting policies for data-handling while respecting privacy, engaging with international partners, and working with private sectors to monitor how this data is accessed and used.

Congress requires the President to create procedures within 180 days to manage risks related to artificial intelligence, including notifying the government of AI-related security threats, biosecurity hazards, and foreign influences. Additionally, these procedures must include government briefings for AI vendors about potential or confirmed foreign exploitation of their systems, and regular updates to key congressional committees on these plans.

The bill mandates the creation of an Artificial Intelligence Security Center within the National Security Agency's Cybersecurity Collaboration Center. This center will provide a research environment for AI security, offer guidance on countering AI threats, promote secure AI practices in national security, and work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, while ensuring access to proprietary AI models for research and limiting the sharing of sensitive information.

Congress believes that the intelligence community should partner with private sector investors and consult with the Department of Defense’s Office of Strategic Capital to develop and use new technologies that support national security goals.

The Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund is established to help move products or services from research to production, with financial aid available as grants or other payments for businesses and nonprofits involved with the intelligence community or Department of Defense. Priority is given to small businesses and nontraditional defense contractors, and the fund is managed by the Director of National Intelligence, who must report annually to Congress on the fund's use and achievements.

The section enhances the authority for public-private talent exchanges in the intelligence community, focusing on fields like finance, biotechnology, and cybersecurity, and extends the duration of temporary details from 3 to 5 years. It also addresses employment, conflict of interest rules, and allows the Director of National Intelligence to hire private-sector employees without requiring a personnel billet, while requiring annual reports on these exchanges for three years.

The section allows the Director of National Intelligence or intelligence community heads to buy products or services from companies that have completed a "work program" with In-Q-Tel without using competitive procedures, if certain needs are met. It requires a written justification for skipping competitive procedures, explaining the need, certifying cost fairness, and detailing any market research done.

The section outlines measures for managing security risks associated with artificial intelligence. It defines different types of AI-related incidents and vulnerabilities, mandates the creation of a voluntary database to track such events, and calls for updated processes to manage these vulnerabilities effectively. It also emphasizes developing best practices for handling risks related to AI model training and supply chains.

The section outlines the protection of technological measures that verify the authenticity of machine-manipulated media, prohibiting actions like subverting these measures or distributing false information about media authenticity. It provides exemptions for certain nonprofit and governmental activities and allows the Attorney General to enforce violations through civil actions, with possible damages ranging from $200 to $25,000 per violation, including provisions for reduced damages in cases of innocent violations or repeated offenses.

Congress expresses its opinion that certain foreign ransomware organizations and their associates should be considered hostile cyber threats by the United States. The bill lists specific groups, like DarkSide, Conti, and others, as examples of these cyber actors.

The section of the bill requires the Secretary of State to designate countries that support ransomware as "state sponsors of ransomware" and report these designations to Congress, while the President must impose sanctions similar to those for state sponsors of terrorism. It also requires various reports on ransomware-related sanctions, country origins of ransomware attacks, and investigative authorities available to respond to such attacks.

The section mandates that ransomware threats to critical infrastructure be considered a top national intelligence priority. It requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide a detailed report to Congress on ransomware threats, including the identification of key actors, their tactics, and any obstacles to countering these threats, within 180 days of the enactment of the Act.

The section establishes a system for governing the classification and declassification of information within the federal government. It requires the President to appoint an Executive Agent and an Executive Committee to manage this process, and it mandates a report to Congress detailing the resources and authority needed for these roles, with an emphasis on public transparency.

The section outlines the President's authority to classify and declassify information to protect national security, setting standards and procedures for both processes. It mandates that no information should be classified indefinitely or used to hide wrongdoing and requires that some records be automatically declassified after 50 years.

The section outlines the President's authority and responsibilities for classifying and declassifying government information to protect national security. It sets up rules and procedures, including that classifications can't conceal wrongdoing or embarrass people, information should eventually be declassified, and that basic scientific research not tied to national security shouldn't be classified.

Each executive agency of the U.S. government that deals with classified information is required to have a program to prevent insider threats. These programs must monitor classified networks, designate a senior official to oversee them, and provide training to employees. Additionally, the Director of National Intelligence must report to Congress every year on how well agencies are following these rules.

The section outlines the requirement for issuing guidelines about security clearances for former presidential appointees in the intelligence community, allowing them to retain access to classified information only under specific conditions. It also mandates that the Director of National Intelligence submit these guidelines to Congress within 180 days and provide an annual report on the clearance status of such individuals.

The section outlines the need for a standardized policy, set by the Director of National Intelligence, that allows private contractors to own and manage secure information facilities for the intelligence community. It also requires the Director to consider cost-saving models where the government does not provide funding and to update Congress about progress and challenges within a year.

The proposed amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 allows different parts of the intelligence community to share goods and services for hoteling initiatives without needing to exchange money or funds, as long as they follow guidelines set by the Director of National Intelligence. Both parties must agree on the provision before it takes place.

The section allows different parts of the intelligence community to share goods or services with each other for hoteling initiatives without needing to exchange money, as long as they follow guidelines from the Director of National Intelligence and both parties agree to the arrangement.

The section updates a law to include spouses of employees from the Department of State and the intelligence community, in addition to those from the military and Department of Defense, making them eligible for certain federal job appointments when they relocate due to their spouse's job. It also defines terms like "remote work" and "telework" to clarify that these spouses can work remotely if needed.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is required to submit a plan to Congress within 90 days to ensure all authorized intelligence collection positions are filled. The plan must include specific goals and timelines to achieve this by September 2025, and assess the staffing balance between different CIA departments.

The section discusses changes to employment rules for the intelligence community, including converting certain positions to a special job category and requiring heads of intelligence agencies to inform congressional committees about employment changes and guidelines. It also outlines the conditions under which the CIA Director and other intelligence officials can terminate employees, emphasizing the need for notifications and explanations to Congress, especially when national security is a concern.

Congress suggests that when deciding if someone can access classified information, activities supporting foreign terrorist organizations should be considered as promoting terrorism, including supporting or seeking funds for these groups.

The section outlines amendments to improve the process for intelligence community employees and contractors to report urgent concerns to Inspectors General. It specifies requirements for complaints, including written submissions, support for submitting complaints, timelines for determining credibility, and conditions for transmitting complaints directly to congressional intelligence committees while ensuring the employee's anonymity and following security practices.

The section amends the National Security Act of 1947 to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of a whistleblower's identity as an act of retaliation and establishes a private legal action for employees affected by such disclosures, allowing them to seek remedies, including financial compensation, after exhausting all administrative remedies.

Under this section, individuals in the intelligence community can disclose classified information to an Inspector General—even if they lack clearance—as long as it follows security rules. These disclosures are treated as authorized, meaning they don't break any secrecy agreements or laws.

The section clarifies that certain Inspectors General have the authority to receive protected disclosures from not only the employing or contracting agency but also from a "covered intelligence community element," expanding their oversight capabilities.

The section of the bill amends the National Security Act to include protections for whistleblowers by adding a new rule that prevents ordering psychiatric testing or examinations as a form of retaliation. This change will apply to all relevant cases from the date the law is enacted.

The amendment to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 specifies that if an individual can show their security clearance issue was influenced by a disclosure they made, it may be considered a violation, unless the agency can convincingly prove the same decision would have occurred without the disclosure.

The amendment removes the previous limit of $300,000 on compensatory damages for cases involving the retaliatory revocation of security clearances and access decisions under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

The section grants the Director of the CIA extra authority to cover the costs for treating serious injuries, especially brain injuries, for employees and their families under special circumstances. It also requires the Director to inform Congress within 30 days whenever such payments are made.

The section allows the Secretary of State and other federal agency heads to use their discretion to pay for or reimburse costs related to treating certain injuries under extraordinary circumstances, which are not covered by other federal laws. It also changes the date from January 1, 2016, to September 11, 2001, for some definitions and clarifies that these rules do not apply to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The section modifies the law to allow the State Department more flexibility in using funds for payments related to specific brain injuries. It requires the Secretary of State to provide an annual estimate of the needed funds to Congress when presenting the budget.

The section requires the Comptroller General of the United States to review the activities of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office, focusing on how it handles unidentified anomalous phenomena and its cooperation with other Federal and non-Government entities, with the findings to be reported to key congressional committees and leaders.

Section 1002 amends the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, specifying that audits of unidentified anomalous phenomena historical records should continue on a quarterly basis until April 1, 2025, and then semiannually until June 30, 2025.

In this section, it defines the bodies involved and limitations around funding related to unidentified anomalous phenomena. It specifies that funds cannot be used for activities related to these phenomena without informing certain Congressional committees and leaders, and independent research funding must be shared with them to be considered allowable expenses.

The section states that this title can be referred to as the "Air America Act of 2024".

Congress acknowledges that Air America, along with its associated companies, worked with the CIA to help the U.S. government from 1950 to 1976. They commended the Air America employees for their sacrifices, including experiencing many casualties, rescuing thousands of people, and working under tough conditions abroad.

The text defines key terms used in the bill, including what constitutes an "affiliated company" related to Air America, identifies relevant congressional committees, and clarifies who is considered a "survivor," "covered decedent," and which jobs qualify as "qualifying service" during a specified period involving Air America and its related companies.

The section authorizes the Director to award $40,000 to individuals who have completed at least 5 years of qualifying service or to their survivors, with an additional $8,000 for each extra year of service beyond the initial 5 years. If the award is for a survivor, the payment is given first to the surviving spouse, and if there is none, it is divided equally among the surviving dependents or children.

The section outlines that the total amount of awards given under this title cannot exceed $60,000,000. If more funds are necessary to pay all valid applications, the Director will ask Congress for additional funds. Additionally, the Director can decide to award money to individuals who provided qualifying service as employees of Intermountain Aviation.

Claimants are eligible for an award payment if they file a claim within 2 years of the regulations' effective date. The Director must decide on eligibility within 90 days and make the payment in one lump sum within 60 days of that decision. Any delays must be reported to Congress within 30 days of the payment's due date.

The section describes the way the Director must set up processes for handling claims related to the title, including how claims are submitted, how awards are determined, and how appeals are handled. These procedures need to be established within 60 days of the Act's passage, published in the Code of Federal Regulations, and are exempt from certain federal rules.

The section clarifies that the title does not grant anyone new federal benefits like retirement or disability benefits, does not alter the legal status of Air America or related businesses, and does not create any additional legal rights apart from the one-time award mentioned in the title.

Under this section, no more than 25% of a financial award can be paid to an attorney or agent for their services if they help someone get an award under section 1104. If an attorney or agent breaks this rule, they can be fined, according to U.S. law.

A decision made by the Director under this section is final and cannot be challenged or reviewed in a court.

The section requires the Director to send a report to Congress every six months until all funds are used up. The report must include the number of award payments made or denied, reasons for any denials, and if there are not enough funds to cover expected claims.

The section expands the authority and responsibilities of amicus curiae under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, allowing them to raise and seek review of privacy and civil liberties issues, access necessary information including some classified documents, consult with other amici, and establishes term limits for their service.

The section amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to specify that directives to certain electronic communication service providers can only be issued if these providers are involved with services mentioned in specific court opinions. It also outlines requirements for notifying the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Congress about newly issued or changed directives, along with guidelines for reporting and reviewing such actions.

The SECURE IT Act of 2024 aims to enhance election cybersecurity by mandating penetration testing for voting systems and establishing a five-year program for independent security testing and vulnerability disclosure. This program involves vetted researchers testing election systems with vendor cooperation while ensuring vulnerabilities are patched and reported in a timely manner, all under rules that protect participants engaging in good faith.

The bill section outlines a 5-year pilot program to test and disclose cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election systems. The program allows cybersecurity researchers, after a vetting process, to safely test election equipment with vendor consent, provides guidelines for reporting vulnerabilities, and includes protective measures for researchers against legal action when acting in good faith.

The section modifies the qualifications for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board by allowing experience in national security or positions needing a security clearance to count as relevant experience.

The section amends a law to ensure that staff salaries on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board cannot exceed the highest salary paid for similar positions within the intelligence community, based on information given by the Director of National Intelligence.

The section outlines changes to various reporting and briefing requirements established under several Acts, mostly by repealing specific reports and altering deadlines. These changes include removing reports on topics like foreign influence in academia and foreign investment risks, modifying briefings about Iranian expenditures, and adjusting the submission date for intelligence community reviews.

The technical amendments increase the funding limits for facilities used by the intelligence community and change copyright rules for civilian faculty at certain institutions, allowing them to own copyrights for their work but also requiring them to grant the federal government a license to use their work.

The section explains that the United States Government cannot hold copyright protection for works it creates, but it can receive copyrights transferred to it. For certain "covered works" created by "covered authors" (faculty at specific military and national security-related institutions), various government officials, like the Secretary of Defense, can require these authors to give the government a license to use their works freely for government purposes.