Overview
Title
To reform the antitrust laws to better protect competition in the American economy, to amend the Clayton Act to modify the standard for an unlawful acquisition, to deter anticompetitive exclusionary conduct that harms competition and consumers, to enhance the ability of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to enforce the antitrust laws, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
Imagine a rulebook to make sure big companies play fair and don't act like bullies. This new plan wants to make the rules even stronger so that super-smart helpers can watch over companies and make sure they don't break the rules, and also to give brave people treats when they tell on companies that cheat.
Summary AI
S. 4308, titled the “Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2024,” aims to improve antitrust laws to enhance competition in the U.S. economy. It proposes changes to the Clayton Act to make it harder for companies to make harmful acquisitions that might lessen competition. The bill seeks to empower the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission with additional tools and resources to enforce these laws, including new civil penalties for antitrust violations and protections for whistleblowers. Additionally, it emphasizes the need for better data and market analysis to support antitrust decisions.
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AnalysisAI
General Summary of the Bill
The proposed legislation, S. 4308: Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2024, seeks to reform antitrust laws to better protect competition in the American economy. It aims to amend the Clayton Act to modify the standards for unlawful acquisitions, deter anticompetitive practices that harm consumers, and enhance the enforcement powers of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The bill underscores the importance of competitive markets for innovation, economic opportunity, and national security, while recognizing the growing challenges posed by market power and consolidation.
Summary of Significant Issues
One notable issue is the complex and technical language throughout the bill. Sections such as "Findings and purposes" and "Unlawful acquisitions" are filled with legal and economic jargon, potentially making the text difficult for the general public to understand. This complexity might hinder public engagement and impede effective critique of the bill's impacts.
Another significant concern is the introduction of civil monetary penalties based on a company's total revenues for antitrust violations. The lack of clear criteria for determining these penalties could disadvantage smaller businesses. This approach might also inadvertently stifle innovation or discourage lawful competitive practices by imposing overly harsh penalties.
Furthermore, the creation of the Office of the Competition Advocate raises issues of potential jurisdictional conflicts. The broad powers and discretion granted to this new office could overlap with existing agency functions, creating ambiguity in enforcement responsibilities.
Impact on the Public and Stakeholders
If enacted, the bill could have a broad impact on the American economy by reshaping antitrust enforcement to curb monopolistic behaviors and promote fair competition. This reform could benefit consumers by ensuring access to more choices at competitive prices and encouraging innovation by preventing excessive market concentration.
Small businesses might face challenges if the penalties are harsh or if compliance with new regulations proves costly. However, these businesses might also benefit from a more level playing field if large corporations are reined in from engaging in anticompetitive practices.
The bill's changes could significantly affect large corporations, particularly those engaged in mergers and acquisitions. Stricter scrutiny and revised standards for what constitutes an unlawful acquisition might complicate their growth strategies. These businesses might need to be more cautious and thorough in demonstrating that their acquisitions won't harm competition.
Workers and consumers might see positive impacts if the proposed reforms successfully reduce economic inequality and increase market dynamism. However, the potential increase in litigation due to the bill's limitations on forced arbitration could slow down dispute resolutions, affecting the speed and efficiency with which consumers and workers can resolve grievances.
Overall, the bill attempts to address long-standing issues in antitrust enforcement, but the implementation of these reforms will require careful consideration to balance the interests of all stakeholders involved.
Financial Assessment
The proposed "Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2024" involves several key financial references and allocations that aim to support its objectives in enhancing competition and reforming antitrust enforcement.
Financial Allocations
One of the primary financial components in the bill is the authorization of appropriations. For fiscal year 2025, the bill proposes an allocation of $535,000,000 for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and $725,000,000 for the Federal Trade Commission. These appropriations are intended to provide the necessary resources for these agencies to effectively engage in antitrust enforcement and to handle increased demands on their resources.
From fiscal year 2026 onwards, the bill specifies that all premerger notification filing fees collected under section 7A of the Clayton Act will be retained and utilized for expenses necessary for enforcing antitrust laws. This provision aims to ensure that resources are sustainably available for the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission.
Civil Penalties and Whistleblower Provisions
The bill introduces civil monetary penalties based on total revenues for violations of antitrust laws, as outlined in Sections 10 and 11. These penalties could be substantial, and their implementation might raise concerns about potentially disproportionate effects on businesses, particularly smaller firms. The penalties could also deter innovation or lawful competitive practices if businesses are overly cautious about potential infractions.
Furthermore, the bill proposes financial incentives for whistleblowers who provide original information leading to enforcement actions that result in fines exceeding $1,000,000. While these incentives aim to encourage reporting of anticompetitive behavior, the requirement for information to be original and the discretionary nature of the rewards could limit their effectiveness. Complex procedural requirements might deter potential whistleblowers.
Funding for New Offices
While the bill authorizes appropriations for broader enforcement efforts, it is less specific about funding for newly proposed offices, such as the Office of the Competition Advocate. The lack of explicit funding details for such offices raises concerns about financial inefficiencies and the potential for wasteful spending, which is an issue identified in the commentary.
Impact of Altering Dispute Mechanisms
Lastly, the provision to bypass forced arbitration for antitrust disputes may lead to increased litigation costs. By preventing the use of predispute arbitration agreements, the bill could result in more cases being settled in court, which could increase the burden on the judicial system.
Overall, the financial references in the bill reflect a strong emphasis on strengthening antitrust enforcement through substantial funding increases for relevant agencies. However, the implications of civil penalties and the efficiency of financial resource allocations deserve careful consideration, particularly concerning potential impacts on businesses and the effectiveness of new offices and incentives.
Issues
The complex and technical language throughout the bill, especially in sections such as 'Findings and purposes' (Section 2) and 'Unlawful acquisitions' (Section 4), may be difficult for the general public to understand, making it challenging to engage with or critique the bill's implications.
The introduction of civil monetary penalties based on total revenues for violations (Sections 10 and 11) and the lack of clear criteria for determining these penalties raise concerns about their potential to disproportionately affect businesses, particularly smaller firms, and may discourage innovation or lawful competitive practices.
The broad powers and discretion granted to the Competition Advocate (Section 8) and the potential overlap with other agency functions could lead to jurisdictional conflicts and create ambiguity in enforcement responsibilities.
The definition of 'exclusionary conduct' (Section 10) and related presumption clauses could lead to significant legal uncertainty for businesses, especially regarding what constitutes 'materially disadvantaging' competitors or 'foreclosing competition'.
The requirement for whistleblowers to have original information and the discretionary nature of whistleblower rewards (Sections 15 and 217) may limit the effectiveness of incentivizing reporting of anticompetitive behavior, while the complex procedural requirements could deter potential whistleblowers.
The exemption from the rulemaking provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code, in sections such as 'Joint civil penalty guidelines' (Section 12) may limit public input and transparency in how penalties are set and enforced.
The lack of specific funding information or budget clarity for the Office of the Competition Advocate (Section 8) and the potential for wasteful spending in GAO studies (Section 7) could lead to financial inefficiencies.
The provision to bypass forced arbitration for antitrust disputes (Section 17) alters the landscape of dispute resolution, potentially leading to increased litigation costs and burdening the judicial system.
The repeated legal references and cross-referencing of U.S. Codes throughout sections, such as 'Definition' (Section 3) and 'Exclusionary conduct' (Section 10), require extensive legal knowledge or additional research, creating a barrier to understanding for laypersons.
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The first section of this bill gives it a short name: the "Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2024."
2. Findings and purposes Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
Congress emphasizes the importance of competitive markets and highlights significant concerns about growing market power and its negative effects on the economy, democracy, and innovation. The proposed purposes aim to strengthen antitrust enforcement, revise legal standards to better address harmful mergers, and enhance protections for individuals reporting anticompetitive behaviors.
Money References
- (a) Findings.—Congress finds that— (1) competitive markets, in which multiple firms compete to buy and sell products and services, are critical to ensuring economic opportunity for all people in the United States and providing resilience to the economy during unpredictable times; (2) when companies compete, businesses offer the highest quality and choice of goods and services for the lowest possible prices to consumers and other businesses; (3) competition fosters small business growth, reduces economic inequality, and spurs innovation and job creation; (4) competitive markets are crucial for the United States global economic competitiveness and national security; (5) in the United States economy today, the presence and exercise of market power is substantial and growing; (6) the presence and exercise of market power makes it more difficult for people in the United States to start their own businesses, depresses wages, and increases economic inequality, with particularly damaging effects on historically disadvantaged communities; (7) market power and undue market concentration contribute to the consolidation of political power, undermining the health of democracy in the United States; (8) the anticompetitive effects of monopoly power or buyer market power include higher prices, lower quality, lessened choice, reduced innovation, foreclosure of competitors, and increased entry barriers; (9) monopsony power or seller market power allows a firm to force suppliers of goods or services to accept below market prices or to force workers to accept below market wages, resulting in lower quality products and services, reduced opportunities for suppliers and workers, reduced availability of products and services for consumers, reduced innovation, foreclosure of competitors, and increased entry barriers; (10) horizontal consolidation, vertical consolidation, and conglomerate mergers all have the potential to increase market power and cause anticompetitive harm; (11) extensive consolidation is reducing competition and threatens to place the American dream further out of reach for many consumers in the United States; (12) since 2008, firms in the United States have engaged in over $10,000,000,000,000 in mergers and acquisitions; (13) the acquisition of nascent or potential rivals by dominant firms can present significant long-term threats to competition and innovation and harm the global economic competitiveness of the United States; (14) the acquisition, by one of its competitors, of a maverick firm that plays a disruptive role in the market, by using an innovative business model or technology, offering lower prices or new, different products or services products, or by other means that benefit consumers, often presents a threat to competition; (15) section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18) is the primary line of defense against anticompetitive mergers; (16) in recent years, some court decisions and enforcement policies have limited the vitality of the Clayton Act to prevent harmful consolidation by— (A) discounting previously accepted presumptions that certain acquisitions are anticompetitive; (B) focusing inordinately on the effect of an acquisition on price in the short term, to the exclusion of other potential anticompetitive effects; (C) underestimating the dangers that horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers will lower quality, reduce choice, impede innovation, exclude competitors, increase entry barriers, or create buyer power, including monopsony power; (D) failing to properly account for direct evidence of competitive harm, including intent evidence; and (E) requiring the government to prove harmful effects of a proposed merger to a near certainty; (17) anticompetitive exclusionary conduct constitutes a particularly harmful exercise of market power and a substantial threat to the United States economy; (18) when dominant sellers exercise market power, they harm buyers by overcharging them, reducing product or service quality, limiting their choices, and impairing innovation; (19) when dominant buyers exercise market power, they harm suppliers by underpaying them, limiting their business opportunities, and impairing innovation; (20) when dominant employers exercise market power, they harm workers by paying them low wages, reducing their benefits, and limiting their future employment opportunities; (21) nascent or potential rivals, even those that are unprofitable or inefficient, are an important source of competitive discipline for dominant firms; (22) antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive exclusionary conduct has been impeded when courts have declined to rigorously examine the facts in favor of relying on inaccurate economic assumptions that are inconsistent with contemporary economic learning, such as presuming that market power is not durable and can be expected to self-correct, that monopolies can drive as much or more innovation than a competitive market, that above-cost pricing cannot harm competition, and other flawed assumptions; (23) the courts of the United States have improperly implied immunity from the antitrust laws based on Federal regulatory statutes, even limiting the application of statutory antitrust savings clauses passed by Congress; (24) the civil remedies currently available to cure violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, including injunctions, equitable monetary relief, and private damages, have not proven sufficient, on their own, to deter anticompetitive conduct; (25) in some cases, effective deterrence requires the imposition of civil penalties, alone or in combination with existing remedies, including structural relief, behavioral relief, private damages, and equitable monetary relief, including disgorgement and restitution; and (26) Federal antitrust enforcement budgets have failed to keep pace with the growth of the economy and increasing demands on agency resources, significantly undermining the ability of the Federal antitrust agencies to fulfill their law enforcement missions and contributing to the rise of market power in the American economy. (b) Purposes.—The purposes of this Act are to— (1) enhance competition throughout the American economy by strengthening antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the State enforcement agencies, and private parties; (2) revise the legal standard under section 7 of the Clayton Act to better enable enforcers to arrest the likely anticompetitive effects of harmful mergers in their incipiency, as Congress intended, by clarifying that the potential effects that may justify prohibiting a merger under the Clayton Act include lower quality, reduced choice, reduced innovation, the exclusion of competitors, or increased entry barriers, in addition to increased price to buyers or reduced price to sellers; (3) amend the Clayton Act to clarify that an acquisition that tends to create a monopsony violates the Clayton Act; (4) establish simple, cost-effective decision rules that require the parties to certain acquisitions that either significantly increase concentration or are extremely large bear the burden of establishing that the acquisition will not materially harm competition; (5) prohibit and deter exclusionary conduct that harms competition, particularly by dominant firms; (6) enable the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to seek civil monetary penalties, in addition to existing remedies, for violations of the Sherman Act; (7) give the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission additional financial resources and enforcement tools to craft remedies for individual violations that are effective to deter future unlawful conduct and proportionate to the gravity of the violation; (8) provide further protections for those who provide evidence of anticompetitive conduct to government enforcers and potential financial rewards for whistleblowers who provide information to the government that leads to a criminal fine; and (9) grant successful antitrust plaintiffs the right to obtain prejudgment interest on damages awards to further deter anticompetitive conduct and increase compensation to injured parties. ---
3. Definition Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
In this section, the term "antitrust laws" refers to its definition in the Clayton Act and includes the part of the Federal Trade Commission Act dealing with unfair competition, as well as the current Act itself and its changes.
4. Unlawful acquisitions Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section explains changes to the Clayton Act concerning unlawful company acquisitions. It defines "market power" and updates how courts should evaluate if an acquisition might reduce competition or create a monopoly or monopsony, specifying conditions like market concentration, control over competing entities, market power, and transaction size.
Money References
- (b) Unlawful acquisitions.—Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18) is amended— (1) in the first and second undesignated paragraphs, by striking “substantially to lessen” each place that term appears and inserting “to create an appreciable risk of materially lessening”; (2) by inserting “or a monopsony” after “monopoly” each place that term appears; and (3) by adding at the end the following: “ In a case brought by the United States, the Federal Trade Commission, or a State attorney general, a court shall determine that the effect of an acquisition described in this section may be to create an appreciable risk of materially lessening competition or to tend to create a monopoly or a monopsony, in or affecting commerce, if— “(1) the acquisition would lead to a significant increase in market concentration in any relevant market; “(2) the acquisition would increase the ability and incentive to engage in exclusionary conduct, as defined in section 26A of the Clayton Act; “(3)(A) the acquiring person has a market share of greater than 50 percent or otherwise has significant market power, as a seller or a buyer, in any relevant market, and as a result of the acquisition, the acquiring person would obtain control over entities or assets that compete or have a reasonable probability of competing with the acquiring person in the same relevant market; or “(B) as a result of the acquisition, the acquiring person would obtain control over entities or assets that have a market share of greater than 50 percent or otherwise have significant market power, as a seller or a buyer, in any relevant market, and the acquiring person competes or has a reasonable probability of competing with the entities or assets over which it would obtain control, as a result of the acquisition, in the same relevant market; “(4) the acquisition would lead to the combination of entities or assets that compete or have a reasonable probability of competing in a relevant market, and either the acquiring person or the entities or assets over which it would obtain control prevents, limits, or disrupts coordinated interaction among competitors in a relevant market or has a reasonable probability of doing so; “(5) the acquisition— “(A) would likely enable the acquiring person to unilaterally and profitably exercise market power or materially increase its ability to do so; or “(B) would materially increase the probability of coordinated interaction among competitors in any relevant market; or “(6)(A) the acquisition is not a transaction that is described in section 7A(c); and “(B)(i) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold an aggregate total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person in excess of $5,000,000,000 (as adjusted and published for each fiscal year beginning after September 30, 2024, in the same manner as provided in section 8(a)(5) to reflect the percentage change in the gross national product for such fiscal year compared to the gross national product for the year ending September 30, 2023; or “(ii)(I) the person acquiring or the person being acquired has assets, net annual sales, or a market capitalization greater than $100,000,000,000 (as so adjusted and published); and “(II) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold an aggregate total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person in excess of $50,000,000 (as so adjusted and published), unless the acquiring or acquired person establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the effect of the acquisition will not be to create an appreciable risk of materially lessening competition or will not tend to create a monopoly or a monopsony.
5. Post-proceeding data Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The amendment to Section 7A of the Clayton Act requires companies that settle antitrust cases concerning acquisitions to annually report details about their effects on competition for five years. These reports must include information on prices, quality, efficiencies, and any measures taken to restore competition, and they must be certified for accuracy by a top corporate officer.
6. Federal Trade Commission study Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section requires the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), along with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to conduct a study within two years about how much influence big investors have in competing companies and how this affects competition. This study will look for public comments and is exempt from certain paperwork requirements.
7. GAO studies Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section requires the Comptroller General to conduct studies on the effectiveness of merger remedies and how mergers affect wages, jobs, innovation, and new business formation, publishing the first within 18 months of the Act's enactment. Similarly, it mandates updates to these studies every four years and calls for identifying specific aspects of mergers that need more research.
8. Office of Competition Advocate Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The Office of the Competition Advocate is a new entity within the Federal Trade Commission, led by a Competition Advocate appointed for a 7-year term. The office's duties include enhancing competition by advising on agency actions, publishing reports on antitrust laws, and having the power to subpoena information from companies about antitrust practices.
9. Office of Market Analysis and Data Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The Office of Market Analysis and Data is a part of the Federal Trade Commission responsible for gathering and managing data to help evaluate business competition, mergers, and the effects of antitrust enforcement. It ensures that all collected data is secure and may create rules for how data is reported and standardized.
10. Exclusionary conduct Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section amends the Clayton Act to define "exclusionary conduct" as actions that harm competition by disadvantaging competitors or limiting their ability to compete. It also sets penalties for such conduct, establishes enforcement guidelines, and clarifies that not all exclusionary actions, like those for legal compliance, automatically qualify as harmful to competition.
26A. Exclusionary conduct Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section defines "exclusionary conduct" as actions that harm competition by disadvantaging competitors or limiting their ability to compete, clarifies that certain activities like enforcing patents are not considered exclusionary, and establishes that such conduct is illegal if it poses a risk to competition. It also outlines that violators may face civil penalties, except when they can prove the conduct has valid procompetitive benefits or new competitors have entered the market, reducing the risk of harm.
26B. Civil penalties Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section outlines that the Commission can start a lawsuit in U.S. district court against anyone who breaks a certain rule of the Clayton Act, with penalties as high as 15% of their U.S. revenues from the previous year or 30% of their revenues in the affected area of business. It also gives the Commission the sole authority to manage such legal actions unless it allows the Attorney General to do so, while still letting the Attorney General step in if needed.
11. Penalties for Sherman Act violations Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section outlines penalties for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, specifying that violators can be fined up to 15% of their total U.S. revenues from the previous year or 30% from any revenues related to illegal activities. It also allows the Federal Trade Commission to seek civil penalties in court for unfair competition practices that violate the Sherman Act, ensuring these penalties are additional to other federal remedies.
12. Joint civil penalty guidelines Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section requires the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission to establish and update, at least every five years, guidelines for determining civil penalties for certain antitrust violations, considering factors like the impact and intent of the violator. Before finalizing these guidelines, there must be a 60-day public comment period, but they are not bound by the usual rulemaking procedures.
13. Market definition Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
In this section, it is explained that under antitrust laws, defining a "relevant market" is not generally needed unless specifically required by law for establishing a presumption or resolving a claim. If there is clear evidence showing harm to competition, then neither the courts nor the Federal Trade Commission need to define a relevant market to evaluate claims. However, they can still consider market definition if it aids in assessing a claim.
14. Limitations on implied immunity from the antitrust laws Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
In this section, it specifies that antitrust laws cannot be overridden by federal regulations unless a federal agency actively regulates the conduct, there is no antitrust law preservation in the federal statute, and the regulations explicitly allow the conduct. It also states that antitrust laws should be fully applied unless there is an explicit exemption or meet specific conditions for implied immunity.
15. Whistleblower protections Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The text amends existing laws to provide whistleblower protections and incentives related to antitrust violations. Whistleblowers, including employees and contractors, are protected from retaliation for reporting suspected violations, and may receive rewards if their information leads to successful enforcement actions with penalties over $1,000,000, with certain restrictions and criteria outlined for eligibility.
Money References
- “(3) COVERED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.—The term ‘covered enforcement action’ means any criminal action brought by the Attorney General under the antitrust laws that results in collected proceeds exceeding $1,000,000.
27A. Anti-retaliation protection for civil whistleblowers Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section outlines protections for employees and other individuals who report suspected antitrust violations, preventing employers from retaliating against them. It also details how whistleblowers can seek legal action if discriminated against, specifies the possible remedies for such cases, and affirms that the section doesn't limit any additional rights whistleblowers may have under other laws.
217. Criminal antitrust whistleblower incentives Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section introduces incentives for whistleblowers in criminal antitrust cases, defining terms like "whistleblower" and "covered enforcement action," and specifying that the Attorney General can award whistleblowers 10% to 30% of the collected proceeds from cases they help solve. It also outlines the criteria for determining award amounts, sets conditions for denial of awards, and allows whistleblowers to appeal decisions to the United States court of appeals.
Money References
- (3) COVERED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.—The term “covered enforcement action” means any criminal action brought by the Attorney General under the antitrust laws that results in collected proceeds exceeding $1,000,000.
16. Prejudgment interest Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
Section 16 of the bill updates the Clayton Act to allow people who are harmed by violations of antitrust laws to sue in a U.S. district court and recover triple the damages, legal costs, and simple interest from the time they file their case until a judgment is made.
17. No forced arbitration for antitrust disputes Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The text amends the United States Code to prohibit the use of predispute arbitration agreements and joint-action waivers in antitrust disputes, meaning these types of agreements cannot be enforced when one side is accused of violating antitrust laws. It specifies that only a court, not an arbitrator, can decide if these rules apply to a particular dispute.
501. Definitions Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
In this chapter, the text defines key terms related to legal agreements and disputes. It clarifies what is meant by an "antitrust dispute," a "predispute arbitration agreement," and a "predispute joint-action waiver," all of which involve legal actions or agreements that might occur before a specific dispute has emerged.
502. No validity or enforceability Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section states that no arbitration or joint-action waiver agreements made before a dispute arises can be valid for antitrust disputes. It also specifies that any disagreements over the applicability or enforceability of these agreements should be resolved by a court, not an arbitrator, even if the arbitration contract suggests otherwise.
18. Additional remedies; rules of construction Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section describes that the rights and remedies given by this Act are additional to those already available under federal law, including certain parts of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. It also clarifies that this Act does not affect the enforcement of antitrust laws or limit any other legal remedies provided by federal law.
19. Authorization of appropriations Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
In fiscal year 2025, Congress is authorizing $535 million for the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and $725 million for the Federal Trade Commission. Starting in 2026, funds from premerger notification fees will be used to support these agencies without needing new appropriations each year.
Money References
- (a) Fiscal year 2025.—There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2025— (1) $535,000,000 for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice; and (2) $725,000,000 for the Federal Trade Commission.