Overview
Title
To prohibit the use of funds for universities that provide support to the People’s Liberation Army, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
The CAMPUS Act is a new rule that says schools in the U.S. can’t use government money if they help the Chinese military, and instead, they should work with Taiwan to teach Mandarin.
Summary AI
S. 1010, also known as the “Countering Adversarial and Malicious Partnerships at Universities and Schools Act of 2025” or the “CAMPUS Act,” aims to prevent U.S. government funds from being used by universities and schools that support the People’s Liberation Army in China. The bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to identify and report Chinese institutions involved in military activities and limits funding and collaboration with them. It places restrictions on hosting classified information in facilities that work with these Chinese institutions, and may deny visas to people involved. Additionally, the bill advocates for partnerships with Taiwan to promote Mandarin instruction and cultural programming in U.S. educational institutions.
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AnalysisAI
General Summary of the Bill
The bill titled "Countering Adversarial and Malicious Partnerships at Universities and Schools Act of 2025," or the "CAMPUS Act," seeks to restrict the use of U.S. federal funds for educational institutions that collaborate with entities linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China. Introduced by Senator Lankford, this legislative piece has been referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The bill seeks to counteract efforts associated with China's Military-Civil Fusion strategy by placing limits on federal funding and other resources.
Key components of the bill include:
- Identification of Chinese universities involved with the PLA.
- Prohibition of Department of Defense funds to entities contracting with such institutions.
- Limitations on facilities handling classified information.
- Restrictions on visa issuance to individuals associated with these institutions.
- Prohibition on funding K-12 schools with contracts with any Chinese entity.
- Encouragement of educational partnerships with Taiwan for Mandarin and cultural education.
- Tightening disclosure requirements for foreign gifts to U.S. universities.
Summary of Significant Issues
A notable concern with the CAMPUS Act is the lack of clear definitions and criteria for identifying institutions supporting the PLA. This ambiguity may lead to inconsistent enforcement and potential diplomatic strain. Sections 2 and 3 of the bill, focusing on Military-Civil Fusion, lack specific enforcement mechanisms, raising questions about eventual implementation and oversight.
The adjustment in Section 9, which reduces the reporting threshold for foreign educational gifts to $50,000 from $250,000, might place additional burdens on institutions without a transparent rationale. Finally, the bill permits actions against individuals seeking U.S. visas but fails to delineate transparent procedures and oversight, potentially leading to decisions that lack accountability.
Public Impact
The CAMPUS Act could have profound implications for academic institutions and their relationships with international entities. By limiting federal funds connected to Chinese collaborations perceived as threats, the bill aims to increase national security. However, the ripple effects could impact educational exchange programs, restrict access to foreign expertise, and influence U.S.-China educational diplomacy.
Broadly, the public might perceive this bill as a protective measure for national interests. Nevertheless, if the intricacies are insufficiently communicated or applied inconsistently, this view could shift toward concern over educational isolation or overreach.
Impact on Specific Stakeholders
Educational Institutions: U.S. universities and schools may face increased administrative challenges managing foreign relationships and reporting gifts due to the bill's stipulations. The tightened overview on collaborations could affect their academic networking, potentially hindering research progress and diversity on campuses.
Chinese Universities and Their Associates: These institutions could experience restrictions in engaging with U.S. entities, limiting avenues for collaborative research, exchange programs, and financial partnerships, which can spur innovation and understanding across borders.
Government and Regulatory Bodies: Agencies responsible for implementing and overseeing the bill will require robust processes and resources. The vague terms and criteria in the bill put a premium on developing effective administrative strategies, possibly necessitating new guidelines and training.
Students and Scholars: The bill could limit opportunities for Chinese students seeking education in the U.S. and American students interested in studying or working with Chinese educational entities. This might impact academic and cultural exchanges, reducing exposure to global perspectives.
In considering the CAMPUS Act, lawmakers and educational leaders must weigh the intended security benefits against possible academic constraints and diplomatic ramifications. The outcome will highly depend on the clarity of implementation and ongoing dialogue between affected parties.
Financial Assessment
The bill titled "Countering Adversarial and Malicious Partnerships at Universities and Schools Act of 2025" or the "CAMPUS Act" contains several sections that directly reference spending and financial allocations. The primary focus of these references is to control how U.S. government funds are used, particularly in relation to educational institutions with ties to the People's Liberation Army in China.
Financial References and Allocations
Section 3 prohibits the use of any funds allocated to the Department of Defense for research, development, testing, and evaluation from being provided to any entity that contracts with institutions identified as supporting the People's Liberation Army. This financial restriction aims to ensure that taxpayer dollars are not unintentionally funding entities that contribute to Chinese military activities. However, the section does not detail specific oversight or enforcement mechanisms, an issue that could hinder effective implementation.
Section 6 similarly bans funds authorized for K-12 education from being allocated to schools that maintain contracts with entities based in the People’s Republic of China. This broad restriction could impact numerous educational collaborations but lacks a clearly defined mechanism for identifying what constitutes a "contract," as noted in the issues.
Section 8 extends the prohibition on funding to entities involved with organizations on the "Entity List" maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security. This section adds another layer of compliance for funding eligibility, yet the complex regulatory language and the lack of clear criteria might confuse stakeholders about the practical implications for funds allocation and enforcement.
Section 9 involves a direct financial figure, amending the reporting threshold for foreign gifts from $250,000 to $50,000. This significant reduction could lead to an increased administrative burden on educational institutions, requiring them to report smaller financial contributions, which had previously been exempted. Without clear justification for this change, institutions might face increased costs and operational challenges in compliance tracking.
Related Issues
The financial references in the bill are intertwined with several issues that could impact implementation. The lowering of the foreign gift reporting threshold in Section 9 could cause practical difficulties for universities and other educational institutions, as they adjust to the new reporting requirements. Concerns arise about whether institutions have sufficient resources to manage this increased reporting burden without additional funding or support.
Sections 2 and 3 introduce an expectation to identify and limit funding for entities involved in China's Military-Civil Fusion strategy. However, the lack of clarity on how these entities will be identified might lead to inconsistent enforcement and potential legal challenges, complicating financial decision-making for institutions that might risk losing funding or unintentionally breach these new requirements.
Moreover, vague terms like "support to the People's Liberation Army" create room for varied interpretations, leading to potentially prolonged debates over eligibility for federal funds and increased complexity for entities seeking funding.
In summary, the CAMPUS Act includes several financial provisions aimed at restricting U.S. funds from indirectly supporting Chinese military efforts through educational relationships. However, without elaboration on identification, enforcement mechanisms, and clear definitions, these financial restrictions might face hurdles in practical application and compliance, affecting both institutions and government efficiency in strategic funding allocation.
Issues
The bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to identify institutions in China supporting the People's Liberation Army (Section 2), but lacks clear mechanisms or criteria for identification. There is potential for ambiguity in classifying institutions which could result in inconsistent enforcement.
The broad language in Section 2 concerning 'support to the People's Liberation Army' and 'involved in Military-Civil Fusion' could be interpreted differently, leading to confusion and possible diplomatic or international trade conflicts.
Sections 2 and 4 lack a defined course of action once entities are identified, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the measures and potential legal implications for universities or research institutions unknowingly involved.
Section 9 significantly lowers the reporting threshold for foreign gifts from $250,000 to $50,000, which could increase the administrative burden on educational institutions without clear justification for the change, potentially leading to increased costs and operational challenges.
The use of the term 'Military-Civil Fusion' in Sections 2 and 3 is not clearly defined, causing potential for misinterpretation about which entities are affected and increasing risks of arbitrary application of funding prohibitions.
Section 3 prohibits the Department of Defense from providing funds for entities engaged in Military-Civil Fusion, but does not specify oversight or enforcement mechanisms, which might lead to ineffective implementation.
The bill in Section 5 allows denial of visas to individuals involved with Military-Civil Fusion without a clearly defined or transparent process for identifying the institutions involved, risking arbitrary decisions and lack of checks and balances.
Section 8's reference to complex regulatory language regarding the 'Entity List' could be difficult for general readers to understand, and the lack of clear criteria for entity inclusion may cause confusion about implications for funding and enforcement.
In Section 6, the absence of a clear mechanism or criteria for defining what constitutes a 'contract' with an entity domiciled in China could lead to enforcement challenges and unintended exclusions in K-12 educational collaborations.
Section 4's requirement for entities to certify the absence of partnership with identified institutions could create legal ambiguities if an entity unknowingly enters a partnership, with no appeals process specified, leading to potential unfair restrictions.
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The first section of the Act introduces its official name, the "Countering Adversarial and Malicious Partnerships at Universities and Schools Act of 2025," which can also be simply referred to as the "CAMPUS Act".
2. Identification of entities engaged in Military-Civil Fusion in the People's Republic of China Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section requires the Director of National Intelligence, working with the Secretary of Defense, to identify Chinese universities supporting the country's military and defense efforts. Additionally, the Director must report these entities to Congress within 180 days of the law's enactment and update the list each year.
3. Prohibition on use of funds for entities engaged in Military-Civil Fusion Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section prohibits any money allocated for the Department of Defense from being given to organizations that have contracts with certain institutions involved in Military-Civil Fusion, as outlined in a previous section.
4. Limitation on eligibility of facilities to host or store classified information Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency cannot allow a facility to handle or store classified information unless the facility's entity confirms it does not have an active research partnership with any institution listed under section 2(b).
5. Denial of visas to individuals involved in Military-Civil Fusion Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section allows the Secretary of State to deny visa applications for certain nonimmigrants, specifically students or employees of certain institutions, involved in Military-Civil Fusion as defined in immigration law.
6. Limitation on uses of funds for K-12 education Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section states that schools in the U.S. cannot receive K-12 education funds from the Department of Education if they have a contract with an entity based in the People’s Republic of China.
7. Partnership with Taiwan Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
Congress expresses the importance of the American Institute in Taiwan enhancing partnerships with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representatives Office to increase Mandarin language instruction and Chinese cultural education in U.S. schools. Additionally, the Secretary of Education is empowered to give grants to schools to support these educational efforts in collaboration with Taiwan.
8. Prohibition on use of funds for Federal grants with entities on the Entity List Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section prohibits federal funds from being used for grants involving entities that have contracts with companies in China identified on specific lists, including the Entity List managed by the Bureau of Industry and Security.
9. Disclosure of foreign gifts Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The text amends the Higher Education Act of 1965 by changing the threshold for disclosure of foreign gifts that universities must report from $250,000 to $50,000.
Money References
- Section 117(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)) is amended by striking “$250,000” and inserting “$50,000”.
10. Definitions Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section provides definitions for terms used in the Act, including which congressional committees are considered "appropriate," what qualifies as an "institution of higher education" in China, and the meaning of "K–12 education."