Overview

Title

An Act To prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other purposes.

ELI5 AI

H.R. 8631 is a rule that says the government won't buy batteries from some foreign companies, mostly from China, after 2027. It also says they can sometimes make exceptions if using those batteries is safe or just for experiments.

Summary AI

H.R. 8631, titled the "Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act," seeks to prevent the Secretary of Homeland Security from using funds to buy batteries from certain foreign companies, mainly Chinese entities, starting October 1, 2027. The bill lists specific companies that are prohibited and outlines circumstances under which waivers could be granted if it is deemed there is no national security risk or if the batteries are solely for research purposes. Additionally, it mandates a report on the effects of these restrictions on the Department of Homeland Security's operations and costs.

Published

2024-09-10
Congress: 118
Session: 2
Chamber: SENATE
Status: Referred in Senate
Date: 2024-09-10
Package ID: BILLS-118hr8631rfs

Bill Statistics

Size

Sections:
2
Words:
869
Pages:
5
Sentences:
20

Language

Nouns: 274
Verbs: 61
Adjectives: 20
Adverbs: 9
Numbers: 46
Entities: 65

Complexity

Average Token Length:
4.24
Average Sentence Length:
43.45
Token Entropy:
4.89
Readability (ARI):
23.51

AnalysisAI

General Summary of the Bill

The legislative proposal, titled the “Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act,” seeks to restrict the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from procuring batteries from specific foreign entities, predominantly Chinese companies, starting October 1, 2027. The bill outlines conditions under which waivers can be granted, allowing exceptions for research or if there’s no national security risk associated with the batteries. It also mandates that any waivers granted must be reported to Congress, and a broader report is required within 180 days post-enactment to assess potential impacts on the DHS.

Summary of Significant Issues

Several critical issues emerge from this bill:

  1. Limitation on Procurement Options: The blanket prohibition could limit DHS's procurement flexibility, potentially increasing costs if alternative sources are scarce or more expensive. This restriction could affect operational efficiency given DHS's vast responsibilities.

  2. Diplomatic and Protectionist Concerns: The specified list of banned entities primarily targets companies from one country, risking diplomatic tensions or leading to accusations of protectionism, particularly in international trade environments.

  3. Discretionary Waivers: The waiver process allows significant discretion to the Secretary of Homeland Security, raising concerns about subjective decision-making. This latitude could lead to inconsistent application of the rules or perceived favoritism.

  4. Congressional Oversight: By informing Congress only after granting a waiver, the bill might reduce legislative oversight and accountability, potentially enabling executive overreach without prompt legislative intervention.

  5. Ambiguity in Production Definitions: The criteria for determining battery production origins are somewhat ambiguous, given the complexity of global supply chains. This might complicate enforcement and compliance efforts.

  6. Scope of Impact Assessment: The report required focuses on specific components within DHS, potentially overlooking wider implications affecting other areas or departments.

Impact on the Public and Stakeholders

Broad Public Impact

The broad intention of reducing dependency on foreign-made batteries could resonate positively with those concerned about national security and self-sufficiency. However, the potential for increased costs might indirectly impact taxpayers if DHS operations become more expensive.

Specific Stakeholders

  • Department of Homeland Security: The DHS faces operational and financial challenges given limited procurement sources and possible increased costs. The flexibility to address these through waivers could mitigate impacts but may add administrative burdens.

  • Foreign Entities and Trade Partners: Entities listed in the bill face exclusion from a significant buyer, potentially impacting their business operations. This might exacerbate trade tensions, particularly with China, affecting international relations and possibly leading to retaliatory trade measures.

  • Congressional Oversight Bodies: The requirement to report waivers and submit an impact assessment report provides a measure of oversight, albeit one that might lack immediacy, potentially hindering proactive legislative responses to executive decisions.

In summary, while the bill addresses national security concerns by reducing reliance on certain foreign battery manufacturers, it introduces complexities that may impact costs, diplomatic relations, and regulatory oversight. Stakeholders within the government and affected industries will need to navigate these challenges carefully to ensure equitable and effective implementation.

Issues

  • The blanket prohibition on procuring batteries from certain entities as stated in Section 2(a) may limit the procurement options for the Department of Homeland Security, potentially increasing acquisition costs if alternative sources are not available or are more expensive.

  • In Section 2(b), the specification of entities that cannot supply batteries might disproportionately affect certain countries, primarily those with companies on the list, leading to potential diplomatic tensions and accusations of protectionism.

  • The waiver provision described in Section 2(d) grants significant discretion to the Secretary of Homeland Security, which could enable subjective decision-making or favoritism without clear, transparent guidelines on the criteria for granting such waivers.

  • The process of Congress being informed only after a waiver is granted, as mentioned in Section 2(d)(3), may reduce the oversight and accountability that Congress can exert over these decisions, potentially allowing executive overreach.

  • The language regarding how a battery is considered produced by a specified entity in Section 2(c) is ambiguous, creating potential challenges in enforcement, particularly given complex global supply chains where components are sourced from multiple countries.

  • The limited scope of the report required by Section 2(e), focusing only on certain components of the Department of Homeland Security, might overlook wider impacts and concerns related to the implementation of this procurement prohibition.

Sections

Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.

1. Short title Read Opens in new tab

Summary AI

The first section of the act states that it can be referred to as the “Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act”.

2. Prohibition on availability of funds for procurement of certain batteries Read Opens in new tab

Summary AI

Beginning on October 1, 2027, the Department of Homeland Security cannot use its funds to buy batteries from certain specified companies, which are mostly Chinese, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security grants a waiver because the batteries don't pose security risks or are needed for research. The Secretary must notify Congress if a waiver is granted and provide a report on the rule's impacts on the department's operations and costs.