Overview
Title
An Act To prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
The bill wants to stop the Department of Homeland Security from buying batteries from some companies in China after 2027, but the head of the department can make exceptions if it's safe or for learning new things. They also have to tell Congress how this rule might change things 180 days after it starts.
Summary AI
H. R. 8631 aims to limit the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) ability to buy foreign-made batteries, specifically from certain Chinese companies, starting October 1, 2027. The law lists 10 specific entities or groups from which the DHS cannot purchase batteries. However, the Secretary of Homeland Security can issue waivers to bypass this restriction if it's assessed that there's no security risk or if the batteries are needed for research purposes. The Secretary must report to Congress about the potential impacts and costs 180 days after the bill's enactment.
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AnalysisAI
Summary of the Bill
The "Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act" aims to restrict the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from purchasing certain foreign-produced batteries starting October 1, 2027. This legislation specifically targets batteries manufactured by a list of predominantly Chinese companies, identified either through previous U.S. laws or regulatory lists. It allows the DHS Secretary to waive this restriction under certain conditions, such as no national security risk or for research purposes. The Secretary must also report the anticipated impacts on costs and operations across different DHS components.
Significant Issues
This bill presents several noteworthy issues. The prohibition could potentially limit the range of procurement options for DHS, especially if alternative battery sources are not readily available or more expensive. Targeting specific entities, largely Chinese, could instigate diplomatic challenges and be perceived as discriminatory or protectionist.
The waiver provisions grant the DHS Secretary significant latitude in deciding whether to bypass the prohibition, which could lead to subjective decisions or perceived favoritism without clear guidelines. Furthermore, post-decision congressional notification may hinder timely government oversight, raising concerns about transparency and accountability.
Another issue is the ambiguity surrounding the definition of what constitutes a battery produced by a specified entity. This vagueness could complicate compliance, especially in situations where battery components are sourced worldwide.
Lastly, the scope of the Secretary's report on the implementation impacts might be too narrow, potentially missing broader implications beyond the immediate DHS components mentioned.
Impact on the Public and Stakeholders
This bill could broadly impact the public by potentially increasing costs for DHS operations due to limited procurement options, which might indirectly affect taxpayer money and the resources available for national security. On a broader economic scale, the bill could influence market dynamics in the battery industry, encouraging domestic production or alternative sourcing but also possibly increasing costs in the short term.
Specific stakeholders, such as the targeted foreign battery manufacturers, could view this as unfair market manipulation, possibly retaliating through diplomatic or trade channels. Yet, U.S. battery manufacturers might benefit, as the legislation would likely increase demand for domestically produced batteries, fostering industry growth.
For government officials and DHS, the bill presents operational challenges. The potential increase in procurement costs and limited supplier options might impede their efficiency and effectiveness, particularly if waivers are not granted judiciously.
Overall, while the Act aims to reduce dependence on adversarial foreign entities, it needs careful consideration of its potential economic, diplomatic, and operational impacts.
Issues
The blanket prohibition on procuring batteries from certain foreign entities specified in Section 2 might increase costs or limit procurement options if suitable alternatives are not available, impacting operational efficiency and national security readiness. (Section 2(a), Section 2(b))
The specification of certain entities, particularly Chinese companies, in Section 2 raises potential diplomatic issues and may be perceived as protectionist, impacting international relations. (Section 2(b))
The waiver provisions given to the Secretary of Homeland Security in Section 2(d) could lead to subjective decision-making or favoritism, as there are no clear guidelines on how these decisions should be made. This may affect accountability and transparency. (Section 2(d)(1), Section 2(d)(2))
The requirement for congressional notification after a waiver is granted may limit Congress's ability to provide timely oversight, potentially reducing checks and balances on the Secretary's decisions. (Section 2(d)(3))
The ambiguity in how a battery is 'treated as produced' by an entity in Section 2 might cause confusion, particularly in complex supply chains with components from multiple sources, complicating compliance and enforcement. (Section 2(c))
The scope of the report required by Section 2(e) might be too narrow, potentially overlooking broader impacts on sectors outside the Department of Homeland Security, and not providing a holistic view of the financial and operational implications. (Section 2(e))
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The first section of the act states that it can be referred to as the “Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act”.
2. Prohibition on availability of funds for procurement of certain batteries Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
Beginning on October 1, 2027, the Department of Homeland Security cannot use its funds to buy batteries from certain specified companies, which are mostly Chinese, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security grants a waiver because the batteries don't pose security risks or are needed for research. The Secretary must notify Congress if a waiver is granted and provide a report on the rule's impacts on the department's operations and costs.