Overview
Title
To prohibit contracting with certain biotechnology providers, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
The "BIOSECURE Act" is a proposed law that wants to stop the U.S. government from working with certain small biology companies, especially from places the U.S. doesn't trust, like China, because they might be used to spy or take important information. It makes sure money isn't spent on things that could be risky, but figuring out how to do this could be a bit tricky and hard because it's not clear who will pay for keeping track of everything.
Summary AI
H.R. 7085, known as the "BIOSECURE Act," seeks to prevent the U.S. government from entering into contracts or using funds for biotechnology services or equipment from certain companies associated with foreign adversaries like China. The bill cites concerns over national security and the potential misuse of genetic data by companies such as BGI and WuXi AppTec, which are believed to have ties to the Chinese military. It establishes a ban on obtaining biotechnology goods or services from these entities, with certain exceptions and waiver provisions, including those for overseas health care services. The bill also requires the development of a list of biotechnology companies of concern and mandates guidance for its implementation.
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AnalysisAI
The proposed bill, known as the BIOSECURE Act, aims to safeguard the national security interests of the United States by imposing prohibitions on contracting with specific foreign biotechnology companies deemed a threat. The legislation highlights growing concerns about particular Chinese biotechnology firms, especially those with ties to the military of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), which the U.S. government perceives as potential risks to national security. The bill seeks to prevent taxpayer money from flowing to such entities.
General Summary
This bill is a legislative attempt to limit U.S. government interaction with foreign biotechnology firms that pose security threats, particularly focusing on Chinese companies like BGI and its affiliates. Under the proposed law, U.S. executive agencies would be barred from procuring products or services from these companies or entering contracts that involve them. Provisions are made for waivers in specific circumstances, alongside a mechanism to establish and update a list of concerning entities regularly. There is an overriding emphasis on data privacy, control, and protecting U.S. interests against undue foreign influence.
Significant Issues
Several notable issues emerge from the bill's stipulations:
Narrow Definition of Concerning Entities: The legislation focuses primarily on select companies, potentially overlooking other emerging threats. Critics argue that the criteria for identifying companies of concern might not be comprehensive enough.
Discretionary Power: Broad discretionary powers are granted to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in identifying concerning companies and issuing waivers. Without strict guidelines, the exercise of this power could be perceived as arbitrary.
Complex Waiver Process: The process for obtaining waivers is detailed and involves multiple levels of bureaucratic approval, which could delay essential contracting activities and add red tape.
Implementation Challenges: The 120-day deadline for creating a list of concerning entities may prove unrealistic, given the need for extensive data collection and interagency discussions.
Broad Definition of Biotechnology Services: By defining biotechnology equipment or services broadly, the bill could inadvertently include a wide array of businesses, possibly stifling innovation and creating legal ambiguities.
Broad Public Impact
The widespread ramifications of this bill hinge on its ability to enhance U.S. national security by limiting potential data espionage and unauthorized access to sensitive genetic information. However, if not carefully administered, it could disrupt government contracts and delay the procurement of vital technologies. It could also impact innovation within the biotechnology industry, where companies might feel restricted or scrutinized.
Impact on Specific Stakeholders
Government Agencies: Agencies may face increased administrative burdens as they adapt to new procurement processes and navigate the waiver system. This situation could challenge operating efficiencies, especially in fast-paced or health-critical environments where rapid deployment of biotechnology is essential.
U.S. & Foreign Biotech Firms: U.S.-based companies may benefit from reduced competition from foreign firms deemed risky. However, the broad definitions could also inadvertently affect them. Conversely, foreign companies might find their market access heavily restricted, impacting their operations and collaborations.
Consumers & Taxpayers: There are potential benefits in terms of enhanced data privacy and national security, yet these could be offset by higher costs or slowed technological adoption if U.S. agencies find themselves constrained under the new law’s mandates.
Conclusion
The BIOSECURE Act represents a key move in safeguarding U.S. national security against perceived foreign threats in the biotech sector. However, its effectiveness relies on careful balance—ensuring robust protections without unduly stifling innovation or burdening agencies with excessive regulation. As with any security-related legislation, maintaining transparency and oversight will be crucial to prevent overreach and to ensure the desired security outcomes are achieved.
Financial Assessment
In examining the financial aspects of H.R. 7085, known as the "BIOSECURE Act," it is important to note that the bill does not explicitly mention any spending or appropriation of funds. The text of the bill is primarily focused on prohibiting financial interactions with certain biotechnology companies that are linked to foreign adversaries, particularly those from China.
Prohibition on Use of Funds
The bill includes prohibitions on the use of United States taxpayer dollars for contracting with specified biotechnology companies. The legislation aims to prevent any procurement, contracts, loans, or grants that involve these entities. This approach indicates a focus on restricting financial flows rather than allocating new funds. The bill’s intent is to safeguard national security by ensuring that U.S. government money does not support companies that might pose a risk due to their foreign ties.
Waiver Process and Financial Implications
While the core focus is on restricting financial transactions with certain biotechnology providers, Section 3(d) outlines a waiver process for instances where exemptions might be necessary. This waiver process is accompanied by specific guidelines, including the need for approval by multiple government entities and detailed notification requirements to Congress. The waiver provisions, although not directly related to spending, involve administrative costs and underscore the complexity associated with managing the protection of financial interests in national security matters.
No Additional Funding Allocation
A notable aspect of the bill is that it specifically states in Section 3(h) that no additional funds are authorized for the implementation of its requirements. This could be seen as a limitation, given that agencies must work within existing budgets to enforce these new prohibitions. This lack of financial allocation may raise concerns about the effectiveness of enforcement, as agencies might struggle with resource constraints to fully carry out the bill’s objectives.
Potential Financial Concerns
Two potential issues identified in the legislative analysis could have financial implications:
Administrative Burden: The waiver process involves multiple governmental approvals and reports. This complexity could incur additional administrative costs, potentially diverting resources away from other important activities within federal agencies.
Implementation Challenges: With no new funding provided, agencies might face difficulties in reallocating existing resources to effectively execute the bill’s mandates. This could potentially impact the bill's successful implementation and its goal of protecting U.S. financial interests against national security risks.
Overall, the financial focus of H.R. 7085 is centered on restricting financial interactions with entities identified as national security threats, rather than on the distribution or allocation of new funds. The bill's reliance on existing budgets for enforcement raises questions about its practical impact and execution.
Issues
The definition of 'biotechnology companies of concern' in Section 3 may be considered too narrow, as it primarily targets specific named entities (e.g., BGI, MGI) and those linked with foreign adversaries. This could potentially exclude other emerging threats, raising both security and competitive fairness concerns.
The broad discretionary power granted to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in Section 3, without clear limits or guidelines, could lead to arbitrary decision-making in the enforcement of the prohibitions, which might be viewed as politically or ethically contentious.
The process for waiving prohibitions in Section 3(d) is perceived to be overly complex and burdensome, requiring coordination and approval from multiple government entities, which could delay urgent decisions and create bureaucratic inefficiencies.
Developing a comprehensive list of biotechnology companies of concern within 120 days as outlined in Section 3(f) could be challenging given the need for interagency coordination and the potential need for intelligence gathering, which may not be feasible in the stipulated timeframe.
The definition of 'biotechnology equipment or service' in Section 3(i) is quite broad and could lead to implementation challenges and legal disputes over what falls under this definition, affecting a wide array of businesses and potentially stifling innovation.
Lack of clarity or criteria for what constitutes 'national security interests' in Section 3(d) when considering waiver extensions could open up subjective interpretation and potential misuse, raising legal and ethical concerns.
The absence of additional funds authorized for implementing and enforcing the bill in Section 3(h) might cripple its effectiveness, as agencies could struggle with resource allocation, impacting the bill's practical implementation.
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The BIOSECURE Act is the name that may be used to refer to this law.
2. Findings; sense of Congress Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
Congress recognizes that China aims to lead in biotechnology and uses laws to access data from companies, including BGI, which poses security risks to the U.S.; therefore, Congress suggests stopping U.S. taxpayer funding to such foreign biotech firms and preventing the purchase of biotech equipment from them.
Money References
- (b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the time has come to— (1) stop United States taxpayer dollars from flowing to foreign adversary biotech companies like BGI that have ties to the PLA; and (2) prevent United States taxpayers from buying biotech equipment from foreign adversaries that facilitate the transfer of United States persons genetic data to a foreign adversary. ---
3. Prohibition on contracting with certain biotechnology providers Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section prohibits executive agencies from buying biotechnology equipment or services from companies deemed a security risk, with some exceptions and potential waivers. It mandates the creation of a list of such risky companies and outlines effective dates, guidance, and regulatory updates, while also defining key terms related to the prohibitions.