Overview
Title
To amend section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, to prevent law enforcement and intelligence agencies from obtaining subscriber or customer records in exchange for anything of value, to address communications and records in the possession of intermediary internet service providers, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
H.R. 4639 is like a rule that says the police and spy people can't buy your computer or phone records without following special rules to keep things fair, and it tells internet helpers how to handle your messages and info correctly.
Summary AI
H.R. 4639, known as the “Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act,” aims to amend section 2702 of title 18, United States Code. The bill seeks to prevent law enforcement and intelligence agencies from buying subscriber or customer records without proper legal procedures. It addresses handling communications and records by intermediary internet service providers and sets strict rules for disclosing information obtained under certain conditions. It also limits civil immunity for providers giving information to the government and reinforces that foreign intelligence surveillance must follow specific legal frameworks.
Published
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AnalysisAI
This bill, H.R. 4639, presented in the 118th Congress, is known as the "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act." It aims to amend section 2702 of title 18 of the United States Code to ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies cannot obtain personal records or information from third parties in exchange for anything of value. The legislation also focuses on communications and records management by intermediary internet service providers and aims to reinforce limits on surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.
General Summary
The bill centers on preventing government agencies from purchasing personal data or records without a court's intervention. Specifically, it seeks to cover records shared or collected by third parties about customers or subscribers. Particularly, it sets strict rules to ensure such information cannot be used in court or government agencies unless obtained legitimately. The bill also emphasizes stricter protocols for how intermediary service providers handle personal data and limits surveillance methods outside the scope of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Summary of Significant Issues
One major issue outlined in the bill is the complex legal language that could present understanding barriers for individuals and smaller organizations who must comply. Sections mention intricate legal standards and heavily depend on cross-references to other statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which adds complexity.
The definition of "intermediary service provider" might be overly broad, potentially leading to unanticipated regulatory burdens on entities not originally intended to fall within this scope. Moreover, the vague definition of "most stringent standard under Federal statute or the Constitution" could lead to varying legal interpretations, causing inconsistency.
Additionally, the bill's short title, "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act," may confuse as it doesn't entirely reflect the bill's comprehensive scope or detailed purposes. This could lead to misunderstandings about what the Act seeks to address.
Impact on the Public
This bill could significantly alter how the public's personal information is managed and accessed by government agencies, potentially providing more privacy protection to individuals. By prohibiting the exchange of valuable records between third parties and law enforcement, the public could see a reduction in unauthorized data sales. However, this could also lead to slower law enforcement processes as agencies adjust to acquire records following stricter standards with court orders.
Impact on Stakeholders
For law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the bill might hinder traditional methods of data acquisition, requiring them to adjust operational procedures to align with more stringent regulations. It may challenge current practices and necessitate additional training and resources to comply fully with new statutory demands.
Intermediary service providers might face additional legal compliance obligations as a result of the broader definition of their role. This could mean increased regulatory scrutiny and potential legal challenges if definitions remain ambiguous.
On the positive side, privacy advocates and civil rights groups may view the bill as a triumph in establishing stronger privacy rights and limitations on governmental overreach, particularly in terms of data exchange without judicial oversight.
In conclusion, while the bill presents an opportunity to enhance data privacy and protection, its complexities and potential for varied interpretation present challenges that could influence its effective implementation. Each stakeholder, including the public, intermediary service providers, and government agencies, may be affected differently, requiring careful consideration and potentially further clarification through legislative and judicial processes.
Issues
Section 2: The bill uses complex legal and technical language that may be challenging for non-experts to understand, potentially leading to misinterpretation or inadequate compliance by smaller organizations or individuals not familiar with legal terminology. Clearer language could aid in comprehension and compliance.
Section 5: There is a significant reliance on cross-references to other laws, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and the Communications Act of 1934. This complexity could confuse those needing to understand the bill's context without providing the required clarity, particularly regarding surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes.
Section 2: The prohibition on obtaining records in exchange for anything of value by law enforcement and intelligence agencies could be a contentious legal issue as it challenges current practices and might require significant procedural adjustments.
Section 4: The definition of 'intermediary service provider' might be overly broad and could include entities not originally intended, potentially leading to unintended regulatory burdens on unexpected parties.
Section 6: The language regarding the conditions under which the civil immunity limit applies is complex, relying on specific legal references which may be difficult for individuals or organizations without legal expertise to understand.
Section 5: The amendment described could lead to potential loopholes due to complexity and ambiguity in the language, as it lacks clear enforcement mechanisms; this may impact oversight and accountability.
Section 3: The phrase 'most stringent standard under Federal statute or the Constitution' is vague and might lead to varying interpretations by different courts, potentially resulting in inconsistent application.
Section 1: The short title, 'Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act', is potentially misleading as it does not provide a clear scope or purpose, which could result in ambiguity regarding its application or implications.
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The first section of the bill states that it can be called the "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act".
2. Protection of records held by data brokers Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section prohibits law enforcement and intelligence agencies from buying or acquiring certain personal records or information, labeled as "covered" or "illegitimately obtained," from third parties. It also sets rules to make sure such information cannot be used in court or shared between government agencies, and it requires procedures to minimize the use and spread of improperly obtained data.
3. Required disclosure Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section explains that a government entity cannot force a third party to disclose records or information about a customer or subscriber unless they have a court order. This court order must follow strict standards, similar to those required if a remote computing or electronic communication service was asked to disclose similar information.
4. Intermediary service providers Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section amends U.S. law to define "intermediary service providers" as those who handle communications for electronic or remote services. It also prohibits these providers from revealing communication contents in storage or customer information to others, including the government.
5. Limits on surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes other than under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section outlines that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is the only allowed method for the U.S. government to conduct certain surveillance activities, such as accessing electronic communication records, location data, web browsing history, and other protected information about people in the U.S. The act specifies that any actions demanding a warrant for law enforcement must also follow FISA rules.
6. Limit on civil immunity for providing information, facilities, or technical assistance to the Government absent a court order Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section of the bill revises the legal framework regarding civil immunity for individuals or entities that provide information or assistance to the government without a court order. It specifies that immunity only applies if there is a written certification of emergency requirements by an authorized person and limits the duration until a court order is denied, the communication is obtained, or after 48 hours of interception.