Overview
Title
An Act To amend section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, to prevent law enforcement and intelligence agencies from obtaining subscriber or customer records in exchange for anything of value, to address communications and records in the possession of intermediary internet service providers, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
The bill is like a rule that says police and spy agencies can't buy your personal information from companies and must follow special rules to get it the right way, so they don't peek at your stuff without permission.
Summary AI
The "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act" (H.R. 4639) aims to protect the privacy of individuals' information that is held by data brokers and intermediaries. It prohibits law enforcement and intelligence agencies from buying or otherwise exchanging anything of value for customer records from these entities. The bill also establishes limitations on the sharing of such information between agencies and restricts its use in legal proceedings if obtained incorrectly. Additionally, it outlines exclusive processes for acquiring various types of personal information for foreign intelligence purposes, emphasizing the need for court orders in line with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
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AnalysisAI
The proposed bill, titled the "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act," seeks to make significant changes to how law enforcement and intelligence agencies can access personal data from third parties. By amending section 2702 of title 18 in the United States Code, the bill aims to prevent these agencies from purchasing subscriber or customer records. It also addresses how data is managed by intermediary internet service providers and specifies lawful means of obtaining various types of communication and location data.
General Summary of the Bill
The bill is structured to protect consumer data from being accessed by law enforcement and intelligence agencies through monetary transactions with third parties, such as data brokers. It establishes definitions for terms like "illegitimately obtained information," restricts the circumstances under which certain records can be obtained or shared, and mandates new procedural standards for handling personal data. Additionally, it sets limits on foreign intelligence surveillance activities outside the scope of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Furthermore, the bill addresses intermediary service providers' obligations and limits civil immunity for entities providing assistance to the government without a court order.
Summary of Significant Issues
One of the primary issues identified is the lack of clear enforcement mechanisms or penalties for violations related to the new prohibitions on data acquisition in Section 2. Without clear consequences, the effectiveness of these prohibitions could be diminished. Furthermore, the complex legal language and definitions throughout the bill, particularly in Sections 2 and 3, may hinder understanding and compliance among the general public and relevant stakeholders. The bill's references to multiple statutes and its complex language also risk overwhelming its readers, specifically when defining legal boundaries for surveillance (Section 5).
Another key concern is the absence of any mention of budgeting or resources for implementing these changes, which may pose a considerable burden on the institutions tasked with compliance, especially given the extensive definitions and compliance measures outlined in the bill.
Impact on the Public
Broadly, the bill could significantly enhance privacy protections for individuals by limiting how government agencies can acquire subscriber records. This focus aligns with growing public concern over data privacy and the potential misuse of personal information. However, the absence of clear provisions for how these measures will be enforced could undermine public trust in their effectiveness.
Impact on Stakeholders
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies: These entities might be negatively affected by the bill, as it could limit some of the tools currently available for acquiring information. The restrictions could complicate investigations, particularly those involving digital evidence obtained through data brokers.
Intermediary Service Providers: They are directly impacted, as they must adhere to stricter rules regarding the sharing of user data. The bill's complex definitions might require these entities to allocate additional resources to ensure compliance and avoid potential legal ambiguities.
Data Brokers and Third Parties: For entities that trade in personal data, the bill could result in a financial impact due to restrictions on selling information to government agencies, reducing a potentially lucrative revenue stream.
The Public/Consumers: On the individual level, consumers may benefit from increased privacy and protection against unauthorized sharing of their data. This aligns with public demand for stronger privacy controls, but it remains uncertain how effectively these protections will be enforced without significant penalties for non-compliance.
Overall, the bill addresses critical privacy rights concerns but requires more clarity in its definitions and enforcement mechanisms to ensure the intended protections are realized and trusted by all stakeholders involved.
Issues
The bill introduces a prohibition on law enforcement and intelligence agencies obtaining records in exchange for anything of value, under Section 2 (Protection of records held by data brokers). However, it lacks clear enforcement mechanisms or penalties for violations, which might affect its effectiveness and lead to ambiguity in its application.
The definition of 'illegitimately obtained information' in Section 2 encompasses complex terms that could be difficult to enforce or contest legally, raising concerns about potential legal ambiguities and challenges in practical enforcement.
The language used in Section 3 (Required disclosure) is complex and involves technical legal terms without in-section definitions, possibly hindering clarity for readers and stakeholders, which poses concerns for public understanding and compliance.
Section 5 (Limits on surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes) aims to specify exclusive means for acquiring certain information, yet its unclear definitions and repeated references to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act might overwhelm readers and create confusion over permissible actions.
There is no mention in the bill of how the required measures will be funded, which could lead institutions to struggle with compliance due to insufficient resources. This is especially significant in Section 2, where definitions and compliance measures are extensive and potentially resource-intensive.
The implications for privacy and civil liberties, particularly regarding surveillance and the handling of location information, web browsing history, and internet search history under Section 5, may attract significant public and ethical scrutiny, demanding clear protections and justifications.
Section 6 (Limit on civil immunity for providing information) presents complex and technical language, which may hinder transparency and raise issues regarding private sector obligations and protections when assisting government agencies without a court order.
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section specifies the short title of the bill, stating it can be referred to as the "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act."
2. Protection of records held by data brokers Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section prohibits law enforcement and intelligence agencies from buying certain records and information, known as "covered customer or subscriber records" and "illegitimately obtained information," from third parties, and restricts them from using such information in legal proceedings. It also mandates procedures to reduce the collection and misuse of this information if obtained incorrectly.
3. Required disclosure Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The amendment to Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, outlines that a government entity cannot make a third party reveal a customer's records or illegally obtained information without a court order. The court order must follow the same rules and standards as if the government were asking a service provider to disclose similar information.
4. Intermediary service providers Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section amends the United States Code to define an "intermediary service provider" as a company or entity that helps deliver or store communications for electronic or remote computing services. It also prohibits these providers from sharing the contents of communications or details about users with anyone else, including the government, without permission.
5. Limits on surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes other than under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section outlines the limits on certain types of surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes, specifying that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and related laws are the only legal ways the U.S. government can gather electronic data about Americans for intelligence. It defines strict guidelines for acquiring location data, internet activity, or any information protected under the Fourth Amendment when it's needed for foreign intelligence, requiring legal authorities like warrants.
6. Limit on civil immunity for providing information, facilities, or technical assistance to the Government absent a court order Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
Section 6 modifies the law to limit civil immunity for individuals or companies who provide information or help to the government without a court order. It specifies that immunity applies only if the assistance stopped when a court order was denied, the information was obtained, or 48 hours after the process started.