Overview
Title
An Act To amend section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, to prevent law enforcement and intelligence agencies from obtaining subscriber or customer records in exchange for anything of value, to address communications and records in the possession of intermediary internet service providers, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
The bill is like a rule that says police and spy agencies can't buy or use people's secrets from the internet without following the law. It also makes sure that companies that help people get online cannot give away private messages without a good reason.
Summary AI
H.R. 4639, known as the "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act," seeks to prevent law enforcement and intelligence agencies from purchasing subscriber or customer records from third parties without proper legal authorization. The bill prohibits these agencies from using or sharing any such records obtained illegitimately, and ensures this information cannot be used as evidence in legal proceedings. It also outlines restrictions on intermediary service providers regarding the divulgence of communication contents or user information. Additionally, the bill establishes exclusive legal routes for acquiring sensitive information for foreign intelligence purposes, emphasizing the need for appropriate legal orders and minimizing unauthorized surveillance activities.
Published
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Bill Statistics
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AnalysisAI
Bill Overview
The "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act" aims to amend certain aspects of U.S. law to enhance the privacy protections afforded to individuals, particularly regarding the acquisition of personal records by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The bill specifically targets how these agencies obtain records from third parties, including data brokers and intermediary internet service providers, ensuring they cannot do so in exchange for anything of value without adhering to strict legal standards. Furthermore, it sets limitations around government surveillance activities conducted for foreign intelligence purposes.
Summary of Significant Issues
One primary issue with the bill lies in its complexity and the highly technical language used throughout the text. Sections detailing the definitions and scope of terms like "covered customer or subscriber record" and "illegitimately obtained information" are crucial yet could be difficult for the general public to comprehend. This complexity may lead to misunderstandings about the bill's implications and enforcement.
Enforcement of the bill presents another challenge, especially concerning the prohibition against law enforcement and intelligence agencies obtaining records in exchange for value due to the widespread activity of data brokers. Additionally, the bill lacks explicit accountability measures or penalties for entities that might breach its provisions, creating potential loopholes that could undermine its intent.
Moreover, while the bill introduces oversight mechanisms for handling improperly obtained information, it does not provide detailed checks or balances to ensure compliance. This oversight gap could pose problems in maintaining accountability, particularly in foreign intelligence contexts.
Impact on the Public
The bill's focus on enhancing privacy protections is likely to resonate positively with the general public, especially as individuals grow increasingly concerned about personal data privacy. By restricting how governmental agencies can access and use personal data, the bill aims to reinforce protections against invasive surveillance practices, potentially improving public trust in privacy laws.
However, the bill's broad and complex language might leave some individuals confused about its practical implications. A lack of clarity might reduce its effectiveness unless accompanied by comprehensive public education efforts to enlighten citizens about their rights and the bill's protective measures.
Impact on Specific Stakeholders
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies: The bill significantly impacts these agencies by limiting their means of acquiring personal data from third parties. While this may complicate certain investigative processes, it also necessitates stricter adherence to Fourth Amendment protections, promoting accountability and the ethical gathering of information.
Data Brokers and Internet Service Providers: Entities in these sectors might face enhanced scrutiny under the new regulations, potentially altering how they conduct business. The intermediary service provider definitions could impose additional compliance requirements, although they might also stimulate a reevaluation of privacy practices and data management.
Legal Professionals and Policymakers: For individuals in legal and policy-making roles, the bill presents an opportunity to refine privacy law understanding and develop clearer, more enforceable guidelines in the future. However, the legislation may also lead to complex legal challenges around terms and implementation, requiring thorough interpretation and potential revisions.
In conclusion, while the "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act" represents a step toward bolstering privacy protections against potentially overreaching surveillance, its effective implementation will likely depend on further clarifications and public education efforts. Balancing privacy rights with the operational needs of law enforcement and intelligence agencies remains a pivotal consideration moving forward.
Issues
The prohibition on law enforcement and intelligence agencies from obtaining records in exchange for anything of value may face enforcement challenges due to the proliferation of data brokers (Section 2).
The lack of specific accountability measures or penalties for entities that improperly sell or share data under Section 2 may weaken the effectiveness of the legislation.
The highly technical language used throughout the bill, particularly in Sections 2, 3, and 5, may make it difficult for the general public to understand, leading to potential misinterpretation.
Section 5 lacks explicit oversight or checks to ensure regulations are followed, raising concerns about accountability in surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes.
Ambiguities in terms like 'obtain in exchange for anything of value' and the 'most stringent standard under Federal statute or the Constitution' (Sections 2 and 3) could lead to varying interpretations and legal challenges.
The section on intermediary service providers (Section 4) includes complex wording and a potentially overly broad definition, which might result in unintended regulatory burdens.
The bill relies heavily on legal references, making it overly complex for those without legal expertise (Section 3).
The bill does not address the potential impact on privacy rights and how this aligns with broader legal standards (Section 6).
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Short title Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The first section of the bill states that it can be called the "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act".
2. Protection of records held by data brokers Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section outlines new restrictions on law enforcement and intelligence agencies, preventing them from buying certain personal records or information obtained illegally from third parties. It also explains procedures to minimize the use of such information if it is acquired improperly, ensuring that evidence obtained this way cannot be used in court.
3. Required disclosure Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section explains that a government entity cannot force a third party to disclose records or information about a customer or subscriber unless they have a court order. This court order must follow strict standards, similar to those required if a remote computing or electronic communication service was asked to disclose similar information.
4. Intermediary service providers Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The section amends U.S. law to define "intermediary service providers" as those who handle communications for electronic or remote services. It also prohibits these providers from revealing communication contents in storage or customer information to others, including the government.
5. Limits on surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes other than under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
Section 5 outlines that surveillance for foreign intelligence within the U.S. must strictly follow specific laws like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, ensuring that the government can only gather information such as phone records, location data, browsing, and search history from people in the U.S. through legal means that protect privacy rights. This section emphasizes that certain communications and data can only be collected legally when authorized by express statutes and only if they involve non-U.S. persons located outside the U.S. or include government acquisition for foreign intelligence without relying on electronic surveillance.
6. Limit on civil immunity for providing information, facilities, or technical assistance to the Government absent a court order Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
This section of the bill revises the legal framework regarding civil immunity for individuals or entities that provide information or assistance to the government without a court order. It specifies that immunity only applies if there is a written certification of emergency requirements by an authorized person and limits the duration until a court order is denied, the communication is obtained, or after 48 hours of interception.