Overview
Title
To prohibit the Secretary of Defense from entering into information technology contracts with entities that provide certain services to China, and for other purposes.
ELI5 AI
H.R. 10453 is like a rule that says the U.S. military can't work with certain tech companies if those companies are helping China make big tech stuff like artificial brains or running computer centers in China unless it's really important for America.
Summary AI
H.R. 10453 aims to prevent the U.S. Secretary of Defense from entering into or renewing information technology contracts with companies involved with certain activities in China. These include businesses that significantly fund facilities in China focused on artificial intelligence, provide software with military applications to Chinese entities, or operate data centers in China. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to waive this prohibition if it is deemed necessary for U.S. national security. The bill outlines these rules to apply to contracts made within three years of its enactment.
Published
Keywords AI
Sources
Bill Statistics
Size
Language
Complexity
AnalysisAI
Summary of the Bill
The proposed bill, H.R. 10453, introduces a prohibition on the Secretary of Defense from entering into, renewing, or extending contracts related to information technology with entities that provide certain services to China. Specifically, the bill targets entities linked to facilities or research organizations in China that focus on artificial intelligence, as well as those offering software with military or dual-use applications to entities connected with the Chinese government. There are exceptions for waivers should the Secretary of Defense find it vital for U.S. national security. This rule will apply to contracts initiated within three years after the enactment of the bill.
Significant Issues
Several issues are notable in the bill's current form:
Broad Waiver Authority: Section 1(b) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the prohibition if justified by national security interests. However, the absence of detailed guidelines or criteria for such waivers may lead to subjective decision-making, potential misuse, and a lack of transparency.
Ambiguity and Lack of Clear Definitions: The term "material interest" is not clearly defined, which could lead to inconsistent interpretations and applications. Similarly, "facility or research organization" lacks clarity, which may lead to challenges in enforcement.
Limited Applicability Period: By limiting the applicability to only three years, Section 1(c) may be insufficient to address extended national security threats related to technology partnerships with Chinese entities.
Complex Compliance Requirements: The language of the bill is complex and could be challenging for entities to fully understand their compliance obligations, leading to potential disputes and non-compliance.
Lack of Oversight and Accountability Measures: There is no mention of mechanisms to ensure implementation and compliance oversight, which might result in oversight gaps.
Impact on the Public
On a broad scale, the bill aims to safeguard national security by preventing IT contracts between the U.S. Defense Department and entities with ties to China. This move reflects growing concerns over cybersecurity and the protection of sensitive information. However, the lack of clarity in definitions and provisions for waivers could create uncertainties and potentially undermine the bill's effectiveness.
Impact on Specific Stakeholders
For technology companies, especially those with international operations, this bill could pose challenges. Companies may need to reassess their affiliations and operations to comply with the new regulations, which could lead to increased administrative burdens and potential financial implications.
For policymakers and defense analysts, the bill provides a framework for protecting national security but lacks sufficient detail to ensure consistent application and enforcement. Without clear criteria for waivers and more precise definitions, decision-making may become inconsistent.
Finally, from an ethical standpoint, providing broad discretionary powers to the Secretary of Defense without clear guidelines could be problematic, potentially inviting politicization of national security decisions, which could impact public trust in government contracting processes.
Overall, while the intention to enhance national security is clear, the implementation of the bill's provisions may need further refinement to ensure effectiveness and mitigate potential unintended consequences.
Issues
Section 1(b) grants the Secretary of Defense broad waiver authority without clear criteria or guidelines, which might lead to potential abuse or lack of transparency. This could be seen as a significant political and ethical issue, as it allows for subjective decision-making regarding national security contracts with China.
The definition of 'material interest' in Section 1(d)(2) lacks specificity and may be open to subjective interpretation, potentially leading to inconsistent application. This ambiguity could cause legal and operational challenges for entities involved.
The term 'facility or research organization' in Section 1(a)(1) is not clearly defined, which could lead to enforcement ambiguity and make compliance difficult for affected entities.
Section 1(c)'s limitation of applicability to only three years might not address long-term national security concerns regarding technology contracts with Chinese entities, raising potential future risks that remain unaddressed.
The wording in Section 1(a) is complex and may be difficult for entities to fully understand their compliance obligations without further clarification. This could lead to compliance issues and disputes over interpretations of the bill.
There is no mention of implementation oversight or accountability measures to ensure compliance with the prohibition outlined in Section 1, which could lead to oversight gaps and weaken the bill's effectiveness.
Sections
Sections are presented as they are annotated in the original legislative text. Any missing headers, numbers, or non-consecutive order is due to the original text.
1. Prohibition on information technology contracts with entities that provide certain services to China Read Opens in new tab
Summary AI
The Secretary of Defense is prohibited from making or extending IT contracts with entities linked to facilities in China involved in AI research, or those allowing certain access to Chinese entities, unless it is necessary for U.S. national security. This rule applies to contracts within three years of the Act's passage, with "covered Chinese entities" being those affiliated with the Chinese government or organizations.